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The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: 
An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform* 
Robert Charles Clarkt 
By anyone's reckoning, the law concerning the federal income taxa- 
tion of corporations and security holders-essentially, subchapter C of 
the Internal Revenue Code,' together with its accompanying regula- 
tions2 and the accumulated body of revenue rulings and case law3-is 
complex. Quite surprisingly for a corpus of rules that is an artificial 
construct of highly self-conscious human intellects, rather than an 
attempt to rationalize preexisting social relations, the law exhibits an 
intricacy approaching that of living systems. The analogy suggests a 
question. Did the corporate tax law, like a mature organism, have its 
major traits determined by a set of genes fixed in its infancy, or did it 
grow in a passive, mechanistic way, its important parts constantly 
shaped and reshaped in response to the shifting pressures of a chang- 
irg environment? 
The inquiry as to whether corporate tax law be animal or machine 
may best be advanced by adopting the perspective of a cultural 
anthropologist. Though "culture" is a term often used to denote a 
society's total system of symbols,4 "a" culture may usefully be defined 
* Copyright ? 1977 by Robert Charles Clark. I am deeply grateful to my colleague, 
Marvin A. Chirelstein, for encouraging me to attempt the analysis in Part III of this 
article, and to Brutce Ackerman, Boris Bittker, Scott Boorman, Guido Calabresi, and 
many other persons for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
A working draft of Parts I and II of this article was reproduced and distributed in the 
Harvard-Yale Preprints in Mathematical Sociology series using monies obtained under 
National Science Foundation Grants Nos. SOC 76-24512 and SOC 76-24394. 
t Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. I.R.C. ?? 301-385. Other parts of the Internal Revenue Code also can be considered 
part of the basic law concerning taxation of corporations. Prominent among these are 
the accumulated earnings tax provisions, id. ?? 531-537, and the personal holding com- 
pany tax provisions, id. ?? 541-547. 
2. Treas. Reg. ?? 1.301-1.383, 1.531-1.547. 
3. The basic treatise that explores these materials, as well as the history, purpose, 
and content of the statutory provisions, is B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (3d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1977, No. 2) [herein- 
after cited as BITTKER & EUSTICE]. A useful collection of cases, together with extensive notes 
on other cases and rulings, is II S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1973) [hereinafter cited as SURREY & 
WARREN]. Current developments, as well as other materials, are digested in [1977] 3 
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) l[? 2300-2595.01 (1976). 
4. E.g., C. GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973) (expounding semiotic theory of culture). 
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as any unified complex of meanings learned and shared by members 
of a human group. More specifically, the printed lore concerning 
corporate taxation-the statutes, regulations, rulings, lawyers' opinions, 
judicial opinions, treatises, and articles-can properly be viewed, in the 
same spirit as the anthropologist contemplates prehistoric pots and 
vases, as a collection of related "cultural products" that furnish insight 
into the structure of a particular society. Similarly, the elaborate be- 
havior of taxpayers, lawyers, revenue agents, courts, and legislators in 
connection with these cultural products can be understood as "cultural 
activities," a source of scientific puzzlement to the outside observer 
trying to discern their various instrumental, ritualistic, and expressive 
aspects. These cultural products and cultural activities together form 
an operational definition of "the corporate tax culture."5 It is an im- 
portant culture that has comparatively clear boundaries. 
With this conceptual framework, the metaphorical question whether 
the corporate tax culture be animal or machine may be unpacked into 
several nonmetaphorical and more precise queries.6 Of urgent interest 
to the anthropologist is whether a given culture can be understood in 
terms of a few fundamental ideas or themes, rather than as a disordered 
manifold of particular products and activities that resists any attempt 
at reduction. This is not a question about the history of a culture, 
though history may be one source of clues to the answer. A second 
crucial task for the social scientist is to determine the scientifically 
lawful character of cultural evolution. Does a given culture change in a 
progressive, cumulative way7 (as medical knowledge certainly does in 
our own society); in a cyclical fashion (as do the fine arts, with 
alternating periods of classicism and romanticism arguably leading 
only to one another); in a random way (as does a sequence of stock 
prices in an efficient neoclassical market); or in accordance with some 
other model? A third and related question concerns the relationship 
5. For introductions to the concept of culture, see A. KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY: CUL- 
TURE PATTERNS AND PROCESSES 60-64 (Harbinger Books ed. 1963); F. MERRILL, SOCIETY AND 
CULTURE 79-83 (4th ed. 1969); J. SPRADLEY & D. MCCURDY, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE 4-6 (1975). These discussions should indicate that the definitional approach 
used in the text is not far away from the center of a very large conceptual circle. 
6. See generally A. KROEBER, supra note 5, at 64-73, 152-82, 194-226, 233-37 (discussing 
nature of cultural processes and patterns of cultural change). 
7. A well-known example of a cumulative view of evolution in human affairs is the 
Weberian hypothesis of a process of rationalization first generated by the advances of 
theoretical science, then spreading to technology, insinuating new rational imperatives 
in social organization, and pressuring for changes in ideologies, philosophies, religious 
beliefs, and the expressive cultural system. See T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 505-20 
(1951). The most striking confirmation of the thesis was developed in Weber's paper on 
the growth of rationalization in music. M. WEBER, THE RATIONAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF Music (D. Martindale, J. Riedel & G. Neuwirth trans. 1958). 
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of cultural changes to developments in other spheres of human 
activity. Often enough, it is conceptually possible to distinguish cul- 
tural changes generated internally from those catalyzed by external 
political, economic, and technological events. Are cultural changes 
independent of such other developments? If not, what are the causal 
connections? Alternatively, are changes in all traditionally conceived 
spheres of activity roughly correlative and reflective of some more 
basic realities? Realistically, of course, this third question is one of 
degree: to what extent do cultural changes occur endogenously, as an 
unfolding of the logic of the cultural scheme itself?8 
The thesis tendered in this article is that definite answers to each of 
the posited questions emerge from a study of the corporate tax culture. 
First, the present highly developed law of the taxation of corporations 
and shareholders is the product of a few basic decisions. These deci- 
sions established principles that account for many important aspects 
of the law, though not, of course, for all its details.9 Second, the 
corporate tax culture has developed from these principles in a cumula- 
tive, evolutionary way rather than in a cyclical or random manner. 
This cumulative evolution displays two important features. It has had 
a fairly constant direction, and that direction has been toward legal 
rules of ever-increasing complexity and specificity.10 Finally, the 
8. What is endogenous to a process of change is, of course, a function of the defini- 
tion of the process, which may be clearer in some contexts than others. One study, 
roughly analogous to the effort here, found that the strikingly parallel development of 
social security and welfare programs in Britain and Sweden resulted primarily from the 
influence of administrative bureaucracies learning from experience with past programs 
and accordingly adjusting and elaborating (rather than redirecting) policies within a 
basic liberal framework; factors such as socio-economic development, elections, political 
parties, and interest groups were of secondary importance. H. HECLO, MODERN SOCIAL 
POLICIES IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN 284-304 (1974). The author concluded that social politics 
could best be viewed as a learning process, rather than as a mere expression of con- 
flicting interest groups or power relationships. Id. at 304-22. Such a view emphasizes 
endogenous forces of change. 
9. As the article approached completion, I was informed that E. Allan Farnsworth 
made a strikingly similar claim about the law of contract remedies. In an excellent 
article, he asserted that "there were seven critical choices, and that from these the 
reader who has the patience to work through the analysis can deduce the bulk of the 
law of contract remedies." Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1970). 
10. Some persons may despondently assume that law is always becoming more com- 
plicated. But to assert that an area of law evolves fairly constantly and cumulatively 
toward complexity is not an obvious, universal, or contentless proposition. Great changes 
in doctrine may occur without one's being able to perceive clear, substantial differences 
in complexity of doctrine at any given phase. See, e.g., James, Proof of the Breach in 
Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REV. 179, 198-99 (1951) (shift 
in tort law from negligence to res ipsa loquitur to strict liability). More strikingly, legal 
change is not infrequently toward simplification. Examples in tort law are the modern 
cases abolishing various charitable, familial, and governmental immunities. See, e.g., M. 
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corporate tax culture is, to a surprising degree, of endogenous origin. 
The pressures created by its own basic postulates have controlled its 
development. To return to the metaphorical question-whether cor- 
porate tax law be animal or machine-it seems clear that the biological 
metaphor is more apt. 
The task of reducing the law of corporate taxation to a few basic 
principles and tracing their direct and interactive effects serves three 
distinct purposes. The first is academic. The immediate objective of 
showing how basic decisions control later developments is to supply 
hypotheses about cultural evolution; the pattern found here may 
stimulate related research and theoretical exploration into the evolu- 
tionary processes of other branches of the law. The second purpose of 
this reductive effort is intensely and narrowly practical. A synthesis of 
corporate tax law ordered in terms of basic axioms should greatly 
facilitate-for students, lawyers, judges, and others dealing with the 
tax law-the recall, understanding, and use of a multitude of particular 
rules. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the present study should 
promote rational tax reform. An axiomatic synthesis of corporate tax 
law suggests a systematic approach to major revisions: posit changes 
in each basic principle, trace their probable effects on the Code and on 
the case law ramifications of the actual decision, and evaluate the result; 
then posit combinations of changes and continue the process. This 
approach, unlike the hit-or-miss technique of debating the merits of 
the intuitively obvious and apparently salient consequences of isolated 
reform proposals, would identify clearly the most important legal 
effects of major reform options. In addition, it would make more 
specific some of the a priori reasons for expecting certain economic 
consequences to flow from specific changes. Because of its emphasis 
on probable changes in the legal culture-each of which has its as- 
sociated level of costs-the method would provide, at the very least, a 
needed supplement to economic analyses that focus only on the sup- 
posed macroeconomic effects of various reforms. 
Part I of this article comments briefly on the dynamics of the 
development of the corporate tax culture, as a useful preface to the 
exegesis of the basic cultural principles. Part II then presents these 
principles and uses them to explain the major features of the present 
tax law. This exercise will lend strong indirect support to the claim 
FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 
227-50 (1971). Another example is the abolition of separate specifications of the duties of 
owners and occupiers of land to trespassers, licensees, and invitees, and the substitution 
of a more general negligence standard. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 
P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). 
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that the culture has evolved endogenously, for the explanation of 
numerous complex problems and their legal solutions will be accom- 
plished-convincingly, I hope-without reference to changing political 
or economic conditions. Enough history is included merely to suggest 
the cumulative progression toward greater legal complexity, a pro- 
gression that most tax scholars and practitioners would likely con- 
cede to be virtually self-evident. Greater historical detail might 
obfuscate the explanatory effort, which is premised upon the sim- 
plicity of the basic relationships among the handful of key principles 
and the multitude of particular tax rules and judicial decisions. After- 
wards, Part III explores the utility of the explanatory scheme for the 
expedition of tax-reform efforts by considering the likely consequences 
of changing one or more of the basic decisions in various ways. It also 
offers a combination of changes that constitutes a promising reform 
package. 
I. The Dynamics of Development 
The evolution of the corporate tax culture displays a recurrent 
pattern of particular events: when a new legal rule is prescribed, there 
follows a continual process of related tax-avoidance efforts by tax- 
payers and counter-responses by the Internal Revenue Service, which 
leads to the formulation of more specific and more complex rules. 
Examination of this pattern will clarify the sense in which the develop- 
ment of the corporate tax culture has been endogenous.-1 Clearly, the 
hypothesis that the culture is a largely closed system evolving in a 
preordained way cannot be pressed to extremes. No real system, short 
of the universe, is totally self-contained. Or, if there is such a system, 
ex hypothesi we will never know about it. Yet the evolution of the 
corporate tax culture is sufficiently separable from the chief external 
forces acting upon it that much can be understood without a detailed 
knowledge of variations in those forces.'2 
The principal internal forces that have shaped the corporate tax 
culture derive from the motivations and aspirations of its different 
groups of participants. Each group-taxpayers, the Service, courts, and 
11. This article focuses principally upon the evolution of ideas. There might be a 
differently patterned process of evolution for specific social and institutional arrange- 
ments connected with corporate tax law-the composition and distribution of the tax 
bar and other groups of corporate tax advisers (such as accountants), the internal 
organization of the relevant parts of the Internal Revenue Service, and so forth. 
12. Perhaps one of the things that has frustrated social scientists most regularly is the 
perception that most social systems, as compared to physical systems, display a much 
lower degree of independence. The corporate tax culture provides a welcome exception 
to this generalization. 
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legislators-displays characteristic behavioral tendencies that are them- 
selves cultural activities and part of the corporate tax culture as de- 
fined. They are therefore endogenous. These tendencies, however, are 
factors distinct from the basic tax principles later invoked as ex- 
planatory tools. By themselves, abstract principles cannot develop into 
a culture. In this obvious sense, corporate tax law has not been a mere 
unfolding of the logic of its postulates. The more interesting and 
instructive point, though, is that one can understand the development 
of the law with little knowledge of actual variations in the strength or 
direction of the participants' behavioral tendencies. Moreover, al- 
though an adequate account of the causes of these tendencies would 
force a resort to considerations exogenous to the corporate tax culture 
-such as theories of psychology or political science-these causal ex- 
planations would be more relevant to a desire for intellectual com- 
pleteness or for greater confidence that the behavioral tendencies exist 
than to explaining and predicting actual developments in the tax law. 
This irrelevance of different theories of motivation forms another 
aspect of the endogenous character of the evolution of the corporate 
tax culture. 
The principal actors within the corporate tax culture are taxpayers 
and the Internal Revenue Service. Taxpayers and their lawyers con- 
tinually seek to discover, invent, and exploit ways of reducing their 
taxes. The plethora of schemes to effect "bailouts"'13 is a striking 
illustration of this tendency. The Internal Revenue Service continually 
counters these new modes of tax reduction. Courts and Congress 
arbitrate the conflicts between the principal actors and function as 
shapers of the cultural environment. But their specific behavioral 
tendencies diverge. 
Courts tend to resolve conflicts in terms of open-ended judicial 
policies and rules.14 Their behavior may be understood as a form of 
adherence to ideals concerning the proper role of the judiciary, as a 
way of preserving and increasing their power, or in some other way; 
for present purposes, the cause of the tendency is of secondary impor- 
13. "Bailout" is a term of art in the corporate tax culture; its meaning is not always 
clear. In this article, the term denotes a scheme by shareholders to extract corporate 
earnings at capital gains tax rates, that is, to avoid the higher ordinary income tax 
presumptively applicable to income distributed by the corporation to its shareholders. 
See p. 105 infra. In addition to pointing out an unquestionably legitimate form of 
bailout, this article will isolate three categories of problematic bailouts that have played 
important roles in the evolution of the corporate tax culture. See pp. 113, 118, 132 infra. 
14. See, e.g., pp. 122-23 infra (creation of business purpose doctrine by courts faced 
with "divisive bailouts"). 
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tance. By contrast, Congress, when bidden by taxpayers or the Service 
to resolve conflicts, often seeks to give the successful bidders more 
certainty. It tends to exercise its power in resolutions couched in 
mechanical rules that superficially appear to reduce both judicial dis- 
cretion and, perhaps, the prelitigation discretion of the losing bidders 
for congressional favor.15 "Mechanical rules" means rules that might 
be programmed into a computer or robot to produce determinate 
answers from an input of neutrally described yet relevant facts. In a 
sense, Congress often legislates with an eye toward the needs and 
capacities of such a "reasonable robot." Very rarely is a rule com- 
pletely or successfully mechanical, of course, but this should not blind 
us to the existence of statutory aspirations toward mechanism. 
The thesis that courts and Congress have different tendencies seems 
to comport with many, though not all, of the major historical develop- 
ments discussed in this essay.'6 But even if it were not true, the evolu- 
tion of corporate tax law would have been toward more specific rules 
as new, unforeseen experiences confronted the initially formulated 
general rules. Legal change, at least under a fairly new statutory 
regime having no common law antecedents, seems inevitably to pro- 
gress in such fashion. Developments in the wake of fresh, specific 
corporate tax rules support this hypothesis.'7 
The one major qualification to the picture of endogenous evolution 
thus far presented is that the speed and magnitude of developments in 
the corporate tax culture undoubtedly are affected by changes in tax 
rates. These in turn depend upon political forces. But such matters 
must be left to the econometrician. Lawyers and anthropologists may 
yet have an interest in morphogenesis, the development of form- 
changes in legal doctrine and patterns of behavior. 
II. Evolution of the Corporate Tax: Elements and Consequences 
Contemporary corporate tax law may be traced to seven basic deci- 
sions or principles.'8 The first two created the so-called "double tax" 
15. See, e.g., p. 112 & note 91 infra (describing Congress's response to judicial "morass" 
created by courts' attempts to specify tax treatment of redemptions); p. 120 infra (describ- 
ing Congress's response to "preferred stock bailout"). 
16. Exceptions to the tendencies appear at p. 103 itnfra (noting open-ended character 
of Congress's original accumulated earnings tax provisions) and at note 147 ifra (describ- 
ing Congress's provision that "boot" received by shareholders in reorganization be taxed 
at ordinary rates if transaction has "effect of the distribution of a dividendd". 
17. See, e.g., p. 103 infra (development of present accumulated earnings tax provi- 
sions); p. 112 infra (development of present tax treatment of redemptions). 
18. Some of the seven principles enumerated here could be reduced to more discrete 
axioms. See, e.g., pp. 100-04 inifra (distribution principle); pp. 107-17 infra (corporate veil 
principle). Others, such as the second (distribution) and fourth (dividend), see pp. 100- 
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system; the next three relate to the special treatment for capital gains; 
the final two concern a general and a special nonrecognition policy. 
Each principle will first be placed in its relevant historical context. 
A discussion of its cultural consequences will follow. It will be ob- 
served that the more baroque phenomena, those which typically pre- 
occupy the corporate tax practitioner, do not emerge until one has 
proceeded well into the list. Indeed, one can predict that the interest 
of the economist will wane, and that of the tax lawyer wax, as the 
explication progresses. 
1. There shall be a separate tax on corporate income (The separate 
tax principle) 
Congress made the crucial decision to impose a separate corporate 
income tax in 1909,19 apparently without a principled assessment of 
the wisdom of such a move.20 The absence of reasoned debate over this 
core cultural principle is not surprising. The tax rate was low, one 
percent of net income in excess of $500021 as compared with today's 
marginal rate of forty-eight percent,22 and economic science was less 
advanced and less widely taught than it is today. Arguing about mis- 
allocations of resources would have reaped little political profit. 
Furthermore, there was no individual income tax in 190923 and thus 
04, 106-07 infra, or the third (capital gains) and fourth (dividend), see pp. 104-07 infra, 
could be combined. The principles might be grouped historically as well. Additional 
principles might conceivably be adduced. See, e.g., p. 107 infra (different tax treatments 
for corporate payments to debtholders than for corporate payments to shareholders). The 
seven principles as formulated in this article represent the author's choice of a convenient 
conceptual grouping and ordering that serves to illustrate the interaction among prin- 
ciples and the resulting growth in doctrinal complexity. 
19. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, ? 38, 36 Stat. 112. The federal govern- 
ment has taxed corporate income continuously ever since. It had been taxed even 
earlier, by the income tax of 1894, but the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the 
entire statute of which this corporate tax was part. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &, Trust 
Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (on rehearing). The tax is today imposed by I.R.C. ? 11. 
20. The legislative history of the 1909 statute bears no indication that Congress 
seriously explored the advisability of the separate tax. Carlton Fox, in his massive 
compilation of documents relating to the Revenue Acts of 1909 to 1948, notes that the 
'reports on the Tariff Act of 1909 are omitted, as they have no relevance to Section 38 
of the act, which comprises the provisions of the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909." 1 
Revenue Acts of 1913, 1914, 1916: Law, Reports, Miscellany at tab "1909" (Carlton Fox 
compil. 1948). Seidman, who, unlike Fox, also considered congressional floor debates, 
produces nothing on point. J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL IN- 
COME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at 1009-11 (1938). 
21. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, ? 38, 36 Stat. 112. 
22. For taxable years ending after December 1, 1974, and before January 1, 1979, the 
rate is 20% of the first $25,000 of a corporation's taxable income, 22% of the next $25,000, 
and 48% of the excess. I.R.C. ? 11. 
23. Until the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, constitutional barriers 
prevented imposition of an individual income tax. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust 
Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (on rehearing) (individual income tax levied by Congress in 
1894 invalidated as integral part of unconstitutional tax statute). 
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no reason to foresee the problem of a "double tax" on corporate-source 
income, that is, one that falls both at the corporate and shareholder 
levels. 
Obviously, without the separate tax principle the corporate tax cul- 
ture as we know it would not exist. Under an alternative system-for 
example, one that simply taxed shareholders on corporate income 
when distributed to them or when realized in a stock sale, or one that 
taxed them as partners, on all current corporate income, whether or 
not distributed-some of the issues explored in this essay would have 
arisen, but the overall shape of the law would be very different. In 
addition, the separate tax principle has spawned three more specific 
sets of cultural consequences, none of which was contemplated in 
1909. 
First, since partnerships and proprietorships are not subject to the 
separate tax,24 the principle has led to an enormous amount of plan- 
ning and litigation focused upon the operational forms of business 
enterprises.25 Judges were called upon to decide whether entities 
denominated trusts or partnerships were corporations in substance and 
to enunciate the factors that distinguish these forms of organization.26 
Taxpayers attempted to construct business forms, such as limited 
partnerships, that would achieve the nontax advantages of the cor- 
porate form without sacrificing the benefits of partnership taxation. In 
response, the Service engaged in selecting and expounding judicial 
criteria and promulgating mechanical rules of classification.27 Con- 
gress, however, has yet to embark on its own attempt to mechanize this 
sector of the tax culture. 
The separate tax principle has also created incentives to lobby for 
24. Generally, a partner is taxed individually on his distributive share of the partner- 
ship's income, gains, or losses, regardless of whether any income is in fact distributed to 
him. See I.R.C. ?? 701-705. Proprietors are treated as individuals for tax purposes. 
25. See, e.g., BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 1-24 to 1-27, 2-1 to 2-26; id. (Supp. 
1977, no. 2) at S2-1 to S2-10; SURREY & WARREN, supra note 3, at 139-52; Miller, Choice of 
the Form of Business Organization, in LECTURES ON TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 297 
(1952). 
References to entire chapters of books or to blocks of annotations appear in this and 
other footnotes. These citations are geared to illustrating the evolution of the corporate 
tax culture. To borrow an idea from the hearsay rule, sources will often be cited not to 
prove the validity of legal points, but simply to prove that sources exist-i.e., that certain 
tensions in the basic principles have in fact given rise to legal-cultural "products." 
26. The leading case is Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) (business trust 
treated as "association" taxable as corporation). 
27. Treas. Reg. ?? 301.7701-1, -2(a) to -2(e) (1967, as amended 1974, 1975). The criteria 
are obviously based on factors discussed in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), 
see note 26 supra. These regulations were issued in 1960 in the wake of court decisions 
against the Service in the professional association area. See SURREY & WARREN, supra note 
3, at 95. 
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special relief legislation. The most striking of the successful lobbying 
efforts is subchapter S,28 which allows specified corporations to elect 
exemption from the separate corporate tax.29 The income of a qualify- 
ing corporation is taxed only to its shareholders.30 Despite the basic 
simplicity of the subchapter S concept, its implementation in 1958 
bred a burgeoning body of relevant lore-over 130 cases and 60 Service 
rulings, many of them due to the statute's restrictiveness and its un- 
clear but numerous provisions.31 
Finally, the separate corporate tax has had a substantial impact on 
business behavior, though there is disagreement on the magnitude and 
precise nature of its influence. The cultural products of this phenom- 
enon include a substantial literature concerning the alleged misalloca- 
tion of resources and inequities among taxpayers caused by the 
separate tax,32 a collection of inconclusive theoretical and empirical 
studies dealing with the incidence of the corporate tax,33 and numerous 
28. I.R.C. ?? 1371-1379. A major purpose of subchapter S was to aid small businesses by 
eliminating the inequitably heavy burden that the corporate tax could impose upon 
lower-bracket shareholders with marginal tax rates lower than the flat corporate rate. 
See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958) (subchapter S designed to allow tax- 
payers to elect business form without considering tax factors and to aid small businesses 
whose shareholders had marginal tax rates below corporate rate). Similar motivations 
produced I.R.C. ? 1244, which allows the decline in value of shares of stock in certain 
small businesses to be treated as ordinary rather than capital loss. See H.R. REP. No. 
2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958) (discussing purposes of encouraging outside investment 
in small business by reducing risk of loss and eliminating inequity of allowing partner- 
ships and proprietorships, but not small business corporations, to deduct losses as 
ordinary loss). See also Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 
14 TAX L. REV. 453 (1959). 
29. This special treatment is, of course, quite restricted. For example, only corporations 
with 10 or fewer shareholders, who in most cases must be individuals, can qualify. See 
I.R.C. ?? 1371(a), 1372(a). 
30. Id. ? 1372(b). 
31. See generally I. GRANT, SUBCHAPTER S TAXATION (1974). The figures in the text 
may be found in the printed advertisements used by the book's publisher to convince 
tax practitioners of the need for a special treatise. See also BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 
3, at 6-1 to 6-38; id. (Supp. 1977, no. 2) at S6-1 to S6-15; SURREY & WARREN, Supra note 3, 
at 555-74; Annot., [1977] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) TfSf 4845-4847M (1976). 
32. See, e.g., McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Incomne Taxes: The 
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532, 540-41 nn.49, 43, 
& 44 (1975) (citing sources). 
33. See, e.g., M. KRZYZANIAK & R. MUSGRAVE, TaHE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATE INCOME 
TAX (1963); R. MUSCRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 415-29 
(2d ed. 1976); J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? (1974) (incidence of 
several forms of taxation, including corporate); Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski, Em- 
pirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Incomne Tax, 75 J. POLITICAL ECON. 
811 (1967); Goode, Rates of Return, Incomne Shares, and Corporate Tax Incidence, in 
EFFECTS OF CORPORATION INCOME TAX 207 (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966); Gordon, The incidence 
of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manufacturing, 1925-1962, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 731 
(1967); Gordon, Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manufacturing: Reply, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 1360 (1968); Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 
70 J. POLITICAL ECON. 215 (1962); Krzyzaniak & Musgrave, Incidence of the Corporation 
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reform-oriented proposals suggesting alternatives to a separate corporate 
tax.34 
2. A shareholder-level tax on corporate income shall be imposed, but 
generally only upon its distribution to shareholders (The distribu- 
tion principle) 
The distribution principle has three analytic components. The first 
is that distributions from the corporation to the shareholders can be 
income taxable to the shareholders. This notion derives from the first 
valid act imposing a federal individual income tax, the Revenue Act 
of 1913, which listed "dividends" (an undefined term) among the 
things included in the term "income.' 35 Apparently, this inclusion 
was an undebated reflex action based on a commonsensical under- 
standing of the concept of income. 
The second aspect of the principle is that only corporate "income" 
is subject to a shareholder-level tax: distributions fairly taxable to 
shareholders should come from the corporation's current or retained 
earnings. The underlying rationale is that a distribution to share- 
holders that in substance consists merely of a return of capital origin- 
ally contributed by those shareholders should not be considered gain, 
much less taxable income. This idea, not explicit in the 1913 statute, 
soon received legislative clarification in the stipulation that "divi- 
dends" are distributions "out of [the corporation's] earnings and 
profits."36 Note that this treatment entails lifting the corporate veil to 
some extent, for the tax treatment of the shareholders receiving a dis- 
Income Tax in U.S. Manufacturing: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1358 (1968); McLure & 
Thirsk, A Simplified Exposition of the Harberger Model II: Expenditure Incidence, 28 
NAT'L TAX J. 1, 195 (1975); Mieszkowski, Integration of the Corporate and Personal In- 
come Taxes: The Bogus Issue of Shifting, 31 FINANZARCHIV 286 (1972); Mieszkowski, Tax 
Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution of Income, 7 J. ECON. LIr. 
1103 (1969); Slitor, Corporate Tax Incidence: Econiomic Adjustments to Differentials under 
a Two-Tier Tax Structure, in EFFECTS OF CORPORATION INCOME TAX 136 (M. Krzyzaniak 
ed. 1966). 
34. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 32, at 549-80 (excellent discussion of alternative 
schemes to integrate corporate with individual income tax); Special Report: Carter's Tax 
Plan, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 29, 1977, at 46, 55-56 (predicting that Carter Administration will 
propose partial integration of corporate with personal income tax). 
35. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 61, ? IIB, 38 Stat. 167 (current version at I.R.C. ? 61). 
36. The original 1916 statute provided that any distribution made "out of [corporate] 
earnings or profits" accrued since March 1, 1913, would be deemed a dividend-taxable, 
of course, at ordinary rates. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, ? 2(a), 39 Stat. 757 (current 
version at I.R.C. ? 316(a)(1)). A 1917 addition specified the priority rule that a distribu- 
tion is deemed to come out of the corporation's most recently accumulated earnings. 
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 63, ? 31(b), added by 40 Stat. 338 (1917). Since 1936, distributions 
out of earnings and profits of the taxable year have been considered taxable dividends 
even if the accumulated earnings and profits account shows a deficit. Revenue Act of 
1936, ch. 690, ? 115, 49 Stat. 1687 (current version at I.R.C. ? 316(a)(2)). Currently, I.R.C. 
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tribution depends in part on tax-accounting attributes of the corpora- 
tion itself. Though the notion seems conceptually unproblematic, it 
has created interpretive and administrative problems.37 
The third and by far the most important aspect of the distribu- 
tion principle is that undistributed corporate income is not generally 
taxable to shareholders. This point was not explicit in the 1913 act but 
was clearly implied;38 it was also discussed in Congress.39 A few years 
later the Supreme Court expressly recognized it.40 The decision not to 
tax shareholders on undistributed corporate income was tied not to 
any specific economic policies or political goals but to the conceptual 
argument that gain in the value of property, that is, gain that has not 
yet been realized, should not be taxed as income. To apply this "real- 
ization" requirement of general income tax law to undistributed 
corporate income, one must view the corporation as separate from 
its shareholders; otherwise, it would seem that taxable gain realized by 
the corporation has been sufficiently realized for tax purposes by the 
shareholders, who have the residual claim to corporate earnings. Here, 
? 316(a) defines dividends as distributions out of current or accumulated earnings and 
profits and goes on to provide that, except as otherwise provided in the Code's subtitle 
on income taxes, every distribution is deemed to be out of earnings and profits to the 
extent thereof. 
The treatment of distributions at the shareholder level is set forth in I.R.C. ? 301; 
subsection 301(c) makes it clear that distributions are first to be treated as dividends 
to be included in (ordinary) gross income, and that only after the corporation's earn- 
ings and profits account has been entirely depleted may a distribution be treated as 
a return of capital or capital gain. As noted in the text, the earnings and profits 
requirement means that a limit is placed on the extent to which the law views the 
corporation as a separate entity; it is not the case that all distributions are dividends, 
but only those out of corporate earnings. The requirement thus cuts against the 
tendency, displayed in the first principle and various aspects of the second and fifth 
principles, to reify the corporate entity. See pp. 97-100 supra; pp. 108-10 infra. 
37. See generally Andrews, "Out of its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on 
the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1956) (arguing that requirement has 
outlived its usefulness). 
38. The implication appears in the provision that penalizes the accumulation of 
earnings for the purpose of evading the individual tax. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 
? IIA, 38 Stat. 166. 
39. See 50 CONG. REC. 3774-75, reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, supra note 20, at 984-85 (Sens. 
Root and Williams). 
40. In Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 343 (1918), Justice Pitney clearly articulated the 
distribution principle in explaining the intended difference in treatment between a 
shareholder's undivided interest in the profits and his participation in dividends declared 
and paid. That undistributed corporate income was not considered income to share- 
holders is also apparent from Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918), which held that a 
stock dividend, because it takes nothing from the company and gives nothing to the 
shareholders but rather changes only the evidence of their ownership interests, was not 
"income" under the 1913 statute. Undistributed corporate income not even subject to a 
change in the paper evidence of claims against it is a fortiori not income to shareholders. 
Cf. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (common stock dividend paid on common 
stock not 'income" within meaning of Sixteenth Amendment). 
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in contrast to the second aspect of the distribution principle, the 
corporate veil is respected. 
The separate tax principle and the distribution principle together 
create a "double tax" on currently distributed corporate income;4' 
they impose an onerous tax at both the corporate and the shareholder 
levels. Taxpayers, of course, wish to escape this double taxation. Two 
basic avoidance strategies are available. One is to cast corporate dis- 
tributions in the guise of something other than dividends. In a close 
corporation, for example, the shareholders' salaries as officers may be 
inflated to eliminate earnings and hence formal dividends. This dis- 
guised dividend strategy is discussed further in connection with the 
fourth principle,42 which adds to taxpayers' incentives to use it. It is 
a common belief among tax lawyers that many close corporations can 
and do nullify the double tax in this manner. 
The second basic strategy is to delay the extraction of corporate 
earnings. The retained earnings strategy rests on the pivotal third 
aspect of the distribution principle. Shareholders often can control 
the retention or disbursement of corporate earnings and hence can 
avoid the double tax simply by retaining earnings instead of distribut- 
ing them.43 At the least, they can reap the benefit of deferring the 
shareholder-level tax. Frequently, they can do even better, if they in- 
corporate the fifth principle into their strategy.44 The significant point 
here is that the retained earnings strategy, with the help of certain 
subsequent principles, enables taxpayers not only to avoid double taxa- 
tion but also to achieve a tax level lower than that of comparable sole 
proprietors or partners.4i 
There is, then, an incentive to retain earnings even though nontax 
business considerations might not indicate this course of action. 
Predictably, taxpayers have responded to the incentive.46 Equally pre- 
41. The shareholder-level tax, of course, does not literally double the tax burden, for 
it applies only to distributed earnings, which necessarily are net of corporate taxes. 
42. See pp. 106-07 infra. 
43. Assume, as will all the numerical examples in the footnotes of this article (unless 
otherwise indicated), a corporation with a marginal tax rate of 48% and a sole shareholder 
with marginal tax rates of 70% for ordinary income and 25% for net long-term capital 
gains. If the corporation earns an additional $100 and distributes the after-tax amount as 
a dividend, the current tax burden is $84.40-i.e., $48 to the corporation and .70 ($52), or 
$36.40, to the shareholder. This tax pattern may be called the "corporate overtax model." 
If the earnings are retained, the current tax burden is $48. As for potential tax liability 
in the latter situation, see note 81 infra. 
44. See pp. 107-17 & note 81 infra. 
45. If the shareholder in note 43 supra operates his business as a sole proprietor or 
partner, the additional $100 of business income would suffer a tax burden of $70. This 
is the '-proprietorship model" of taxation. See note 24 supra. 
46. See Blume, Crockett & Friend, Stockownership in the United States: Characteris- 
tics and Trends, SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Nov. 1974, at 18. 
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dictably, the courts and Congress have elaborated the law in an effort 
to make successful avoidance techniques more difficult to consum- 
mate. The chief cultural results are the complicated accumulated 
earnings tax47 and personal holding company tax provisions48 and the 
large accretion of related judicial decisions.49 
The accumulated earnings tax provisions impose a stiff penalty tax 
on every corporation "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoid- 
ing the income tax with respect to its shareholders . . . by permitting 
earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distrib- 
uted."50 Accumulation of earnings "beyond the reasonable needs of 
the business" presumptively establishes illicit purpose.51 The present 
provisions can be traced to a short clause in the Revenue Act of 
1913.52 Thus in contrast to its performance in connection with most 
of the other basic decisions, Congress seems here to have foreseen, at 
least dimly, a major and recurrent problem that would result from the 
principles it was establishing. In 1921, the "reasonable needs of the 
business" criterion and the approach of penalizing the corporation 
rather than taxing shareholders as if they had received dividends were 
first adopted,53 and this basic pattern continues. 
But the legislation did not halt the evolutionary process, for the 
open-ended references to improper purpose and business needs have 
resulted in numerous legal decisions, most of which are heavily fact- 
dependent and of scant use as precedents.54 Congress, in a bid to 
mitigate the horrors of the swamp of case law, eventually moved to 
enlarge, complicate, and mechanize the statutory provisions, as a 
comparison of those in the 1954 Code55 with those in the 1921 Code56 
will show. In the former, but not the latter, appears an involved defini- 
tion of "accumulated taxable income"57 and special burden-of-proof 
47. I.R.C. ?? 531-537. 
48. Id. ?? 541-547. 
49. See Annot., [1977] 4 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ??f 3300-3321, 3325-3348 (1976). 
50. I.R.C. ? 532(a). 
51. Id. ? 533(a). If the Service establishes that earnings have been accumulated 
"beyond the reasonable needs of the business," the corporation must disprove its allegedly 
illicit purpose by a preponderance of the evidence. 
52. The Revenue Act of 1913 provided that if a corporation was "formed or fraud- 
ulently availed of" to escape the individual income tax by permitting profits to accu- 
mulate, each shareholder would be taxed on his ratable share of profits, whether or not 
distributed. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, ? IIA, 38 Stat. 166. 
53. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 220, 42 Stat. 247. 
54. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 8-3. See generally id. at 8-1 to 8-27. 
55. I.R.C. ?? 531-537. 
56. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 220, 42 Stat. 247. The 1921 Code expanded the 
1913 provisions. See note 53 supra. 
57. I.R.C. ? 535. 
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rules.58 Nonetheless, it is extremely doubtful that the accumulated 
earnings tax provisions have had any significant tendency to curtail the 
widespread use of the retained earnings strategy. The statute normally 
requires proof of reasonable business needs-a difficult task. Moreover, 
investors in public corporations can easily and blamelessly avoid its 
thrust. Those whose tax brackets make the strategy highly desirable 
may invest in corporations that retain most of their earnings for good 
business reasons; others may prefer companies with higher dividend- 
to-earnings ratios. The retained earnings strategy remains optional, 
because investors can choose and switch companies instead of trying 
to force managements to make economically unwise accumulations. 
The personal holding company tax provisions deal with a related 
problem, the abuse of the closely held corporation that derives much 
of its income from sources such as passive investment properties and 
personal services. Taxpayers have used such companies to avoid the 
steeply graduated income tax on individuals. For example, an in- 
dividual in a high tax bracket might organize a corporation (an "in- 
corporated pocketbook") to hold his personal investment portfolio of 
stocks and bonds, so that the dividends and interest received and re- 
tained by the company are taxed at the flat and (for him) relatively 
low corporate rate. The traditional weapon, the accumulated earnings 
tax provisions, proved ineffective against such devices, and Congress 
responded in 1934 with explicit legislation that makes the punitive 
personal holding company tax dependent upon quite mechanical 
standards concerning stock ownership and sources of income.59 The 
provisions have since grown in detail.60 
3. Long-term capital gains shall be taxed at rates substantially lower 
than those applicable to ordinary income (The capital gains 
principle) 
Capital gains were first given preferential treatment by the Revenue 
Act of 1921.61 The chief ostensible purpose was to increase tax 
58. Id. ? 534. The 1921 statute did provide that proof of accumulation of earnings 
beyond the "reasonable needs" of the business would be "prima facie evidence" of a 
purpose to evade taxes. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 220, 42 Stat. 248. 
59. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, ? 351, 48 Stat. 751. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra 
note 3, at 8-33 to 8-34. 
60. Compare the provisions of I.R.C. ?? 541-547 with Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 
? 351, 48 Stat. 751-52. 
61. From 1913 to 1921, capital gains were subject to the same tax rates as other in- 
come; since the latter date they have been accorded preferential tax treatment. The 
precise conditions of the preferential treatment, and its specific nature, have varied over 
the years. In the period covering the income years 1922 to 1933, capital gains were 
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revenues by counteracting what is now known as the "lock-in effect." 
Taxing gains accrued over a series of years as a lump sum when 
realized assertedly retarded the sale of capital assets by greatly en- 
hancing the amount of surtax.2 Preferential treatment for capital 
gains was intended to encourage such transactions and thus to function 
as an income-averaging device, albeit a crude one. The preference was 
expected to increase revenues not only by stimulating profit-taking 
transactions but also by limiting the tax-reducing value of capital 
losses.63 Prevision of undesirable consequences of the principle seems 
to have been narrowly focused on an alleged unfair boon to "specula- 
tors."64 
The proximate consequence of the capital gains principle, which of 
course has vast ramifications throughout federal income tax law, is 
that it creates an incentive for taxpayers either to seek capital gains 
income in preference to ordinary income or to concoct "bailouts"- 
schemes to transform corporate distributions that normally would 
appear in ordinary income form into proceeds that appear to be 
capital gains. 
Unlike the other principles, the capital gains principle is an inde- 
pendent one, not limited to the corporate context. But because of the 
binary character of the tax preference it creates-income from an asset 
sale either qualifies for the treatment or not, with no in-betweens-it 
became crucial for the law to characterize corporate distributions and 
separated and accorded a preferential maximum rate. The system inaugurated by the 
Revenue Act of 1934 and effective until 1938 required that percentages of capital gains 
be included in income; the specified percentages varied with the length of time the 
assets had been held. In the next period, beginning with the Revenue Act of 1938 and 
essentially continuing into the present, features of the preceding periods were combined- 
percentage inclusion of capital gains and losses (but not on a sliding scale) and an 
alternative flat rate tax. E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 629-31 (1976); Wells, Legislative History of Capital Gains under the Federal 
Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12 (1949). The present provisions are codified at 
I.R.C. ?? 1201-1254. 
The wavering legislative treatment, as well as the confusion in the case law, may re- 
flect deep uncertainty about the justification, if any, of preferential treatment for capital 
gains. See M. CIIIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ? 16.01 (1977). See generally L. 
SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES (1951); Blum, 
A Handy Suimmnary of the Capital Gains Argutments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957); Miller, Tile 
"Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation (parts I-II), 59 YALE L.J. 
837, 1057 (1950); Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 985 (1956). 
62. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, 
supra note 20, at 813-15 (1938). These comments relate directly to a 1920 House bill 
provision that was not enacted; they were, however, part of the process leading to the 
1921 act. 
63. See id. 
64. See the comments of Senators Walsh and Lenroot, quoted in J. SEIDMAN, supra 
note 20, at 815. 
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shareholder dispositions of corporate stock. Thus the third decision is 
essential background for appreciating the fourth and fifth. 
4. Corporate distributions to shareholders are presumptively to be 
treated not as capital gains but as ordinary income, that is, as 
dividends (The dividend principle) 
One aspect of the dividend principle-that dividends are to be taxed 
at ordinary rates-is the result not of decision but of inaction. In 1921, 
when giving preferential tax treatment to capital gains, Congress 
failed to specify preferential treatment for dividends. The inaction 
was perfectly consistent, of course, with the rationale of counteracting 
the lock-in problem, for the problem does not extend to dividend 
payments. Corporations can generally avoid sporadic, lump-sum 
dividends to shareholders by retaining current earnings or dipping 
into accumulated earnings as necessary to establish a consistent 
dividend payout pattern. Shareholders are free to make their prefer- 
ences known by investing in or avoiding companies with regular pay- 
out patterns. 
A subtler aspect of the dividend principle-that corporate distribu- 
tions are "presumptively" dividends-appears in the tracing rule that 
corporate distributions are deemed to come first out of corporate 
earnings and profits to the extent thereof, a rule that appeared in the 
course of Congress's statutory elaboration of the idea that dividends 
are "out of earnings and profits."65 Obviously, the rule is designed to 
eliminate taxpayer discretion in naming the source of a given distribu- 
tion-a power that might be used to evade taxes on virtually all 
distributions. 
In conjunction with some of the other basic principles, the dividend 
principle has prompted much taxpayer maneuvering and governmental 
reaction. As noted in the preceding discussion of the distribution 
principle,66 one comparatively simple maneuver is merely to disguise 
dividends as something else. Especially in close corporations, what are 
in substance distributions of corporate profits to shareholders as such 
have been cast, often successfully, in the form of nontaxable loans, 
singly taxed salaries, interest payments on loans, payments for or sales 
of property and services, and the like. To be sure, there would be 
pressure to disguise dividends even if undisguised dividends were taxed 
at capital gains rates,67 but the pressure would not be as intense. One 
65. See note 36 supra. 
66. See pp. 100-04 supra. 
67. See pp. 147-49 infra (tracing effects of taxing dividends at capital gains rates). 
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should think of the actual development of disguised dividend tech- 
niques as a result of the double-tax system (the separate tax and dis- 
tribution principles operating together), significantly aided and 
abetted by the dividend principle. 
In any event, a considerable body of case law attempts, rather in- 
conclusively, to deal with these behaviors: there are efforts to find 
"excessive" salaries and to recharacterize the excess as a dividend pay- 
ment;68 to find shareholder loans to be equity investments in sub- 
stance; 69 to find sales between corporations and their shareholders 
"unfair" to the corporation and to that extent a withdrawal of profits 
rather than a bargained exchange;70 and so forth.71 In particular, the 
problems of distinguishing true debt (and its attendant, singly taxed 
interest payments) from disguised equity (with its doubly taxed divi- 
dend payments) have proven so intractable, and therefore have gen- 
erated such a substantial volume of activity within the culture,72 that 
one might characterize the policy decision to treat corporate payments 
to debtholders differently from corporate payments to shareholders as 
a distinct one almost equal in magnitude to the others listed here.73 
More complicated disguises of dividends emerged in the culture as 
shareholders devised techniques combining simple strategies with the 
next three basic principles. 
5. Shareholder dispositions of stock are presumptively to be treated 
purely as dispositions of capital assets, that is, independently of 
corporate-level events (The corporate veil principle) 
The corporate veil principle might be labelled blandly the disposi- 
tion principle, but here is named after a more interesting feature. The 
principle has several aspects. The first is that stock is a capital asset: 
gain from its sale or exchange may qualify for preferential tax treat- 
ment. No one seems ever to have doubted that stock is a prototypical 
capital asset. The Revenue Act of 1921 did not explicitly include 
corporate stock in its definition of "capital asset," but did define the 
68. See, e.g., Annot., [1977] 1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1T1T 1370-1376 (1976). 
69. See, e.g., Annot., [1977] 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 9 2377.654-.73 (1976). 
70. See, e.g., Annot., in id. at ? 2377.48-.489 (1976). 
71. See generally Annot., in id. at 1 2377.0248-2377.90 (1976); Comment, Disguised 
Dividends: A Comnprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 207 (1956). 
72. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, sUpra note 3, at 4-1 to 4-59; id. (StIpp. 1977, 110. 2) at S4-1 
to S4-18 (citing sources). 
73. The decision is clearly treated as a major policy problem in W\arren, The Corporate 
Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585 (1974), and Note, Toward 
ANew Modes of Tax Decision maki7ng-The Debt-Equily Inmbroglio and Dislocationis in Tax 
Lawmnaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1695 (1970). 
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term as property held for investment rather than consumption,74 a 
criterion that catches stock if anything. This too was consistent with 
the aim of counteracting the lock-in effect, for only property that its 
owner would normally want to sell at some point (investment property 
but not property held for consumption) could be subject to the cloud 
of a potential lump-sum tax on realized gain. And appreciation in the 
value of stock is often thought to be an easily locked-in gain. A second 
aspect of the principle is indicated by the word "presumptively." Bail- 
out techniques have prompted Congress to treat stock as something 
other than a capital asset under certain circumstances, which will be 
touched upon below.75 
A more subtle but important aspect of the fifth principle, also 
implicit in the 1921 decision, is that stock dispositions are generally 
treated without regard to corporate-level events and attributes. Thus, 
all gain from the sale of a share of stock is routinely treated as capital 
gain. Basically, the law divides sales proceeds into only two parts: 
proceeds are first considered nontaxable recoveries of the selling share- 
holder's investment to the extent of his "basis" or historical cost; all 
excess proceeds are capital gains. This is true even though such gains 
may be attributable, not just to appreciation in the value of the 
underlying corporate assets, but in whole or part to the corporation's 
accumulated earnings. But this existing method of conceptualizing 
proceeds from sales of stock is not written in the stars. A threefold 
division of proceeds is rationally conceivable and is in fact used for 
corporate distributions. Under this long-familiar pattern,76 distribu- 
tions are deemed to come first out of the corporation's earnings and 
profits to the extent thereof, that is, to be dividends taxable at ordinary 
rates. Excess amounts are then treated as recoveries of the shareholder's 
investment to the extent of his basis in the stock. Any further excess 
amounts-due, one supposes, to unrealized appreciation in the value 
of distributed assets-are treated as capital gains. One might wonder 
why this pattern was not adopted for stock sales as well. 
The answer may be grasped by imagining a system in which the 
corporate veil decision had not been made. Suppose that a corpora- 
74. The term "capital asset" was defined to mean "property acquired and held by 
the taxpayer for profit or investment for more than two years (whether or not connected 
with his trade or business), but did not include property held for . . . personal use or 
consumption . . . or inventory...." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 
243 (emphasis added). Curiously, the present provision, I.R.C. ? 1221, omits the "for 
. . . investment . . . not . . . consumption" language and is thus less clear in its implied 
inclusion of corporate stock. 
75. See pp. 119-20 infra. 
76. See I.R.C. ? 301. 
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tion's "earnings and profits"77 were regularly allocated to separate 
corporate accounts for each outstanding share of stock. Suppose further 
that the law had made the first four decisions but had not adopted the 
corporate veil aspect of the fifth principle. Under such a system, any 
corporate distribution with respect to a share of stock would be 
deemed to come first out of the share's earnings and profits account. 
It would constitute, to that extent, taxable ordinary income to the 
shareholder and would reduce that particular share's earnings and 
profits account by the same amount.78 Proceeds from the sale of a 
share of stock to an unrelated third party would, to the same extent, 
constitute ordinary income to the selling shareholder, and the earnings 
and profits account would be reduced accordingly.79 Whenever sales 
proceeds equaled or exceeded the share's earnings and profits account, 
the latter would obviously be reduced to zero. Clearly, if this system 
were working properly, the tax treatment of stock-sale proceeds would 
be the same as that of corporate distributions. 
The problem lies in successfully implementing such a hypothetical 
system. The corporation would be compelled to identify and keep a 
separate earnings and profits account for each share of stock. More- 
over, every sale of stock would require two legally mandated exchanges 
of information. The selling shareholder would be obliged to get, or 
the corporation to give, information about the preexisting status of 
the earnings and profits account of each share involved. And the 
corporation would be obliged to get, or the selling or buying share- 
holder to give, information about the terms of the stock sale. With 
traditional information-processing technology, such a system would 
be incompatible with a cheap, smoothly functioning capital market 
for shares of stock in large, publicly held corporations. And even in a 
world with advanced, computerized bookkeeping, more fundamental 
77. "Earnings and profits" is the Code's jargon for a firm's current and retained 
earnings, as adjusted in numerous ways for tax purposes. See Andrews, suipra note 37, 
at 1404-13; Katcher, What is Meant by Earnings and Profits, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL TAXATION 235 (H. Sellin ed. 
1960). 
78. Suppose X Corporation, formed a few years ago, has outstanding 100 shares of 
common stock and no other equity securities. No stock has been sold by shareholders 
since formation of the company. Its accumulated profits are $500; thus, $5 has been 
allocated to each share's earnings and profits account. X then distributes to the share- 
holders $20 per share. Five dollars of each $20 payment would be a dividend taxable as 
ordinary income. All earnings and profits accounts would be reduced to zero. 
79. If a shareholder of the corporation described in the preceding footnote sells one 
share of stock for $20 before the corporate distribution, $5 of his proceeds would be taxed 
as ordinary income. The earnings and profits account for that share would be reduced 
to zero and, upon the ensuing distribution, the buyer, unlike the other shareholders, 
would include none of the $20 in ordinary income. He would not suffer, as under current 
law, from the "miracle" of income without gain. 
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problems would endure, for with different classes of stock, significant 
ambiguities and complexities would inhere in allocating earnings and 
profits to individual shares.80 It is readily understandable that the 
law did not opt for the hypothetical regime. The desire for efficient 
capital markets and the administrative nightmares of the alternative 
system have virtually forced the adoption of the veil principle. 
Notice, however, the consequences of the decision. In effect, the law 
has conceded that at least one form of bailout, the stock sale to un- 
related third parties, is unquestionably legitimate. As a corollary, the 
buyer who receives a dividend immediately after buying stock at a 
fair price has taxable income even though, from his point of view, his 
investment has not yet increased in value-the "miracle of income 
without gain." 
This aspect of the corporate veil principle has interacted with the 
distribution and capital gains principles to produce two important 
cultural consequences. One is the widespread use of the retained earn- 
ings strategy to avoid the double tax. Corporate earnings are plowed 
back into the business, and shareholders later reap the gains by selling 
some or all of their stock at prices that reflect the corporation's re- 
tained earnings. This strategy subjects corporate earnings not to a 
corporate-level ordinary income tax plus an immediate shareholder- 
level ordinary income tax on dividends, but rather to a corporate-level 
ordinary income tax plus a deferred shareholder-level capital gains 
tax.81 
The second and more interesting consequence is that the stock-sale 
bailout has been perceived as so unavoidable and thus as so "natural" 
80. If a company has noncumulative preferred stock, for example, allocating accu- 
mulated earnings among preferred and common shares would be arbitrary, since the 
preferred's actual share would depend upon future decisions of the directors. 
81. If the shareholder in note 43 supra operates in corporate form but retains earnings 
and later turns into cash the value of the after-corporate-tax retained earnings ($52) by 
selling some of his stock and claiming long-term capital gains treatment, the total tax 
burden will be $61-the corporate tax of $48 plus the capital gains tax of .25 ($52), or 
$13. Part of it ($13) will be deferred. This tax pattern may be called the "corporate under- 
tax" model. The corporate overtax model would impose a total tax burden of $84.40, the 
proprietorship model one of $70. See notes 43 & 45 supra. 
These examples may create a misleading impression of the potential for tax reduction 
inherent in the retained earnings strategy. If, for example, the shareholder in the 
preceding paragraph had already incurred substantial net long-term capital gains of over 
$50,000, then his marginal rate for capital gains would be 35%/o (one half of 70%). See 
I.R.C. ? 1201(b), (c). If he cashed in his capital gain by selling stock, the corporate under- 
tax model would produce a total tax burden of $48 + .35 ($52), or $66.20. This is still 
less than the tax incurred under the proprietorship model, but the difference is smaller. 
Moreover, for shareholders with marginal tax rates of 48% or less, the corporate form 
is generally disadvantageous. For those in the 48%0-70%1 range, there is less likely to be an 
advantage as one moves downward from 70%, unless the value of the deferral of the 
capital gains portion of the total tax becomes correspondingly greater. 
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that the stock sale has become the paradigm of a legitimate bailout. 
Some of its attendant characteristics have been transmuted into 
criteria of permissible bailouts in other contexts. Specifically, since a 
sale of common stock typically involves a sacrifice of proportionate 
voting power and equity interest in the corporation's residual earn- 
ings, the law has required that this sacrifice be made in order to 
legitimate certain other types of bailouts.82 This crucially important 
tendency is in one sense very odd: there seems to be no intrinsic, 
rational connection between sacrifice of equity interest and voting 
control and the treatment of income as capital gain.83 
The corporate tax culture becomes really interesting-for the tax 
lawyer-when transactions jointly invoke the dividend principle and 
the capital gains and corporate veil principles. WVith these principles 
established, the law early confronted the problem of dealing with 
liquidations and redemptions, hybrid transactions that involve both a 
corporate distribution and a disposition of stock. The distributive 
aspect, the flow of assets from corporation to shareholder, points to 
tax treatment at ordinary rates; the dispositional aspect, the share- 
holder's relinquishing shares of stock, points to tax treatment at capital 
gains rates. The legal response to the dilemma has been to bottom the 
tax treatment upon the relative magnitude of the dispositional aspect 
of the transaction. Complete liquidations have thus been analogized 
to stock sales since 1924.84 Treatment of hybrid transactions, such as 
partial liquidations or redemptions, that affect only part of a corpora- 
tion's stock is intrinsically more difficult to specify. The result has 
been a constant stream of regulatory pronouncements, statutory elab- 
orations, and fighting in the courts.85 
The main provision governing redemptions86 reflects these tensions. 
Its predecessor in the Revenue Act of 1921 was fairly simple in 
language. The key and perduring phrase "essentially equivalent to a 
dividend" marked out redemptions not qualifying for capital gains 
treatment.87 The need to tax some redemptions as dividend distribu- 
82. See pp. 112-14 infra. 
83. See generally Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 
247 (1957); Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
985 (1956). 
84. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, ? 201(c), 43 Stat. 255; S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 
1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 266, 274. 
85. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 9-1 to 9-68; id. (Supp. 1977, no. 2) at S9-1 
to S9-22; SURREY & WARREN, supra note 3, at 396-438, 448-62. 
86. I.R.C. ? 302. 
87. The provision reads as follows: 
A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the distribution of any such 
dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such time and in 
ill 
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tions was then seen rather narrowly as a corollary of the exemption of 
stock dividends from inclusion in shareholder income;88 the Revenue 
Act of 1928, however, generalized the "essential equivalence" test by 
making it applicable to all redemptions, not just to redemptions of 
stock issued as a dividend.89 
The open-ended character of the test obviously left room for much 
argument and litigation between the Service and taxpayers. In 1954, in 
response to " 'the morass created by the [judicial] decisions' " and " 'the 
considerable confusion' " in the area, Congress added the present Code's 
mechanical "safe harbor" tests.90 Basically, these provisions require 
the sacrifice of a specified quantum of a shareholder's proportionate 
equity and voting interests before a redemption of his stock will be 
deemed a disposition of shares that qualifies for capital gains treat- 
ment. A simple set of rules focusing merely on reductions in the 
separate interests of individual shareholders, however, is easy to cir- 
cumvent; hence Congress has struggled to formulate attribution rules, 
which have their own complex lore.9' And because a corporate dis- 
tribution can easily be disguised as a "sale" of stock to a specious out- 
sider such as a corporation actually owned and controlled by the 
"selling" shareholder, the Code has been forced to add further provi- 
sions to define and deal with "redemption through use of related 
corporations."92 
Similarly discriminating treatment applies to partial liquidations. 
Some qualify for capital gains treatment, but some do not.93 Here the 
law built on the decision that complete liquidations partake more of 
dispositions than of distributions. Shareholders relinquishing stock in 
a putative partial liquidation qualify for capital gains treatment if 
such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption essentially 
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount received in redemp- 
tion or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as a taxable dividend to the extent 
of the [post Feb. 28, 1913] earnings or profits .... 
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 201(d), 42 Stat. 228-29. 
88. The provision was enacted in response to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 308 (1970) (discussion of legislative history). 
89. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, ? 115(g), 45 Stat. 822. 
90. I.R.C. ?? 302(b)(2), (3). See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1970) 
(citing Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962); and H.R. REP. No. 
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4060) 
(discussion of legislative history). 
91. See I.R.C. ? 318; Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the 
Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1958) (calling for more uniformity and 
simplification). Though complex as formulas, these rules often are fairly easy to apply. 
This does not mean, however, that they are free of ambiguity. See [1977] 3 STAND. FED. 
TAX REP. (CCH) I II 2389-2394.05 (1976) (regulations and annotations). 
92. I.R.C. ? 304. 
93. Id. ? 346. 
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their exchange of stock for corporate assets is one of a series of redemp- 
tions leading to complete liquidation of the corporation, or if the ex- 
change results from the liquidation of one of two or more separate 
businesses carried on by the corporation.94 Significantly, the law thus 
involves the taxpayers, the Service, and the courts in the exercise of 
trying to perceive two or more "business enterprises" operating within 
the single legal entity, the corporation, in order to determine whether 
the cessation of one of the enterprises-a complete liquidation of one 
business, though not of the legal entity-is what led to the distribution 
in question. Inevitably, this attempt to accomodate business realities 
in addition to corporate legal forms has created a hothouse for the 
growth of litigation.95 
The corporate veil, capital gains, and dividend principles have thus 
been compromised to make the stock-dispositional aspect of liquida- 
tions and of some redemptions and partial liquidations determinative 
of tax treatment. The resulting liquidation and redemption bailouts 
constitute a first category of problematic bailouts, here called "simple" 
bailouts because they do not involve the sixth or seventh principles.96 
The legal treatment of these bailouts is highly unstable, inherently so 
because of the tensions among the third, fourth, and fifth principles. 
Even the simple bailouts that are currently legal, such as straight- 
forward complete liquidations, are not really endowed with the same 
legitimacy as the sale of stock to unrelated third parties. Leading com- 
mentators, for example, have expressed skepticism about the validity 
of analogizing liquidations to stock sales.97 And, of course, the Service 
continually challenges many redemptions and partial liquidations as 
impermissible bailouts.98 
A related distribution-disposition hybrid has produced a higher- 
order simple bailout, the bootstrap acquisition-a sale of stock at arm's 
length to a third party combined with a financing distribution to 
either seller or buyer. The bootstrap acquisition is useful, for example, 
when a controlling shareholder wants to sell his entire interest in the 
corporation, but the potential buyer can afford to purchase only part 
of the stock at a price reflecting the true value of the underlying 
corporate assets. To accommodate both interests, the corporation is 
94. Id. ? 346(b)(1), (2). 
95. See generally Caplan, The Five-Year Active Business Rule in Separations and 
Partial Liquidations, 1961 S. CAL. TAX INST. 211; McGaffey & Garmer, Factors That Will 
Today Prove a Distribution Was Made in Partial Liquidation, 31 J. TAX. 204 (1969). 
96. See pp. 117-35 infra. 
97. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 11-3. 
98. See generally Annot., [1977] 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ITIT 2310.025-2314.79, 
2496.1933-2496.45 (1976) (annotations to I.R.C. ?? 302, 346). 
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"thinned down" to the buyer's scale. The seller, before the sale of all 
his stock, may cause the corporation to pay him a sufficiently large 
dividend to compensate for a lower selling price; or, either before or 
after the sale of part of his stock, he may have a sufficiently large 
portion of his stock redeemed to make purchase of the remainder 
feasible for the buyer. Alternatively, the buyer, before his stock pur- 
chase, may borrow what he needs to pay the full price of all the seller's 
stock and then, after the purchase, thin down the corporation by a 
dividend to himself or a redemption of part of his shares, in order to 
repay the loan. 
Viewed in isolation, the stock-sale component of any of these varia- 
tions is clearly a disposition invoking the corporate veil decision and 
qualifying for capital gains treatment. But the tax treatment of the 
financing component, or thinning down process, may seem, when 
viewed as an isolated step, to depend on the form and timing of the 
particular financing device. If the distribution is not cast in the form 
of a redemption, that is, if the recipient does not at the moment of 
distribution give up shares of stock, the dividend principle would seem 
to require ordinary income tax treatment. If, however, the distribu- 
tion takes the form of a redemption, timing may seem crucial. If the 
seller has some shares redeemed before selling the remainder, the 
redemption may very well appear dividend-equivalent under the 
Code's compromise between the dividend and corporate veil prin- 
ciples,99 because the seller may not have sacrificed a sufficiently large 
portion of his equity rights and voting power to satisfy the statutory 
tests for capital gains treatment. Conversely, if he first sells a portion 
of stock and then has the corporation redeem the remaining shares, the 
redemption will appear to meet these tests quite easily, since im- 
mediately afterwards the seller has no interest in the corporation at 
all. Similar problems of timing could affect the buyer.100 
99. I.R.C. ? 302. See p. 112 supra. 
100. The issues raised in the text may better be understood by considering five varia- 
tions of a simple numerical example. The first three variations deal with the timing 
issue, the next two with the form-of-distribution issue. Assume that X Corporation has 
a fair market value of $200 and earnings and profits of $100. The sole shareholder (S) 
wants to sell all his stock. The potential buyer (B) can pay only $100. 
(1) X redeems 50% of S's stock for. $100. Afterwards, S sells B the other 50%, also for 
$100. The redemption, however, might be considered dividend-equivalent, since S still 
holds 100% of the outstanding shares immediately after it occurs; he has not yet made 
the required sacrifice of proportionate ownership and voting power. See I.R.C. ? 302 
(b)(1), (2), (3). 
(2) B temporarily borrows $100, pays S $200 for all of the X stock, and then causes X 
to redeem 50% of the shares for $100. B uses the $100 redemption payment to repay the 
loan. But this merely puts B in the position of S in the preceding example: after the 
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The case law offspring of the bootstrap acquisition disclose many 
other factual variations that seemingly bear on tax results.'0' The 
basic question is whether variations in form and timing should affect 
the overall tax results, or whether a uniform tax treatment should be 
applied to all bootstrap acquisitions that are functionally equivalent 
in their business results. The latter option entails a further choice 
among possible tax patterns. The courts have yet to achieve complete 
redemption, B has the same proportionate ownership interest and voting power that he 
had immediately before it, so the redemption might be considered dividend-equivalent. 
(3) S sells 50% of his X shares to B for $100, then causes X to redeem his remaining 
shares for $100. Immediately after the redemption, S has no interest in X, and thus ap- 
pears to qualify for "exchange" treatment-that is, for taxation at capital gains rates. 
(4) X makes a $100 distribution before the stock sale. S does not surrender any stock. S 
then sells all his shares to B for $100. Here, the distribution appears to be a straight- 
forward dividend taxable at ordinary rates, even though the whole transaction is 
economically equivalent to those described in the first three situations. 
(5) B borrows $100 and buys all of S's stock for $200. X Corporation then distributes 
$100 to B, who does not surrender any stock. B repays the loan. Again, the distribution 
seems a straightforward dividend, but why the tax result should depend upon the 
formality of surrendering stock certificates (thus creating the appearance of a redemp- 
tion) is unclear. 
101. The basic patterns set out in note 100 supra are frequently complicated. The 
deal might be financed out of post-acquisition earnings of the purchased company. See, 
e.g., Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952) (type (3) situation, but redemption accomplished 
with notes; payments on notes not considered dividends to buyer, i.e., not likened to type 
(2) situation or type (5) situation). There might be a bootstrapped shifting of control to an 
existing shareholder. See, e.g., Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958) (one 
50% shareholder redeemed in full, leaving the other a 100% owner; redemption not 
considered dividend-equivalent). In the latter case, the transaction might have been 
recharacterized as a sale by one shareholder to the other, followed by a redemption from 
the latter (as in a type (2) situation); or as a dividend to both shareholders, followed by 
one's purchase of the other's shares (as in a type (4) situation). Both treatments, while 
not the same, would have been harsher than the actual result. 
Another variation occurs when the distribution to the selling stockholder in effect dis- 
charges the buyer's previously contracted obligation to purchase all of the seller's stock. 
In this situation, the distribution may be recharacterized as a dividend to the buyer, 
followed by his use of the money to buy stock from the seller. See Wall v. United States, 
164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). In general, however, the cases and rulings have been favor- 
able to taxpayers. See, e.g., Milton F. & Robbie Priester, 38 T.C. 316 (1962) (obligor as- 
signed contract to third party, who then purchased the stock; held, no dividend to 
obligor); Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42 (continuing shareholder can avoid dividend 
treatment so long as there is no existing primary and unconditional obligation on his 
part to purchase shares later redeemed). 
Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971), involved a variant of the type 
(4) situation. The corporation was thinned down by a pro rata distribution to all share- 
holders, whereupon some of them bought out the others. But the court in essence re- 
characterized the transaction as a type (2) situation, yielding an even harsher tax result: 
the buying shareholders were treated as getting direct dividends and constructive divi- 
dends (those paid directly to the sellers), which were used to meet the "real" purchase 
price obligation. The decision is a bad one, not because the taxpayers suffered, but be- 
cause a court entering the recharacterization game ought to set out all the functionally 
equivalent alternative routes to a certain business result-in this context, all five of the 
situations set out in note 100 supra-and give some reasons for choosing one as the 
paradigm. When each court focuses upon only two functionary equivalent alternatives at 
a time, chaos in the decisional law is the most likely result. 
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rationalization of the area, but through a fascinating development of 
case law, starting with the leading case of Zenz v. Quinlivan,102 the 
treatment of many of the variations on the bootstrap theme seemingly 
has been settled for the short run, often to the detriment of the divi- 
dend principle.103 
It should be stressed that the tension and confusions in the redemp- 
tion, partial liquidation, and bootstrap acquisition areas are very likely 
irresolvable. Impossibility theorems in economics provide a tempting 
analogy.'04 Given the dividend and the corporate veil principles, 
spurred on by the capital gains incentive, the treatment of hybrid 
transactions necessitates a choice among competing principles. Where- 
ever the line is drawn, taxpayers will try to fudge it in one direction, 
and the Service will try to fudge it in the other. And fudging tends to 
engender statutory complexity. Whether a stable level of statutory 
complexity has now been reached or will soon be achieved or even 
whether an equilibrium exists at all is a difficult and perhaps un- 
answerable question. It appears, however, that radical simplification 
is not likely except as a result of bold strokes-reversal of one or more 
of the basic decisions-and in any event is more likely to be temporary 
than permanent. One can only hope that the new levels of com- 
102. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (contemporaneous sale and redemption characterized 
as type (3) pattern in note 100 supra; redemption not considered dividend to selling 
shareholders). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961) (redemption preceded 
sale but was part of prearranged transaction; redemption not considered dividend). Al- 
though the Carey case indicates that a type (1) situation may be treated favorably in the 
manner of a type (3) situation, other cases, following Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 
(4th Cir. 1947), indicate that a type (2) situation will not be so treated. See Television 
Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960) (buyer borrowed funds, 
purchased all shares, and had some redeemed to repay loan; redemption held to con- 
stitute dividend). And in Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971), discussed 
in note 101 supra, the court assimilated what was basically a type (4) transaction into the 
type (2) pattern. But fortunately for well-advised taxpayers, the threatening implications 
of Casner were blunted and the basic validity of the Zenz pattern confirmed in Enoch v. 
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781 (1972). 
See generally Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions: The Redemp- 
tion Route vs. the Dividend Route, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1459 (1974) (arguing for elimination 
of differences in tax result that depend on which financing route is chosen); Kingson, 
The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861, 884 (1976). 
See also Ginsburg, Letter to the Editors, 86 YALE L.J. 798, 801-05 (1977), and Kingson, 
Author's Reply, id. at 806, 808 (debate about analysis of bootstrap cases in Kingson's 
article). 
104. The impossibility theorem in social welfare economics demonstrates that, if one 
accepts certain ascertainable and inconsistent conditions of "fairness" in social choice, one 
cannot maximize social welfare through collective choice, i.e., by aggregating individual 
preferences into a single societal preference. The theorem was first formulated by 
Kenneth Arrow. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). For discus- 
sion and explanation of Arrow's "paradox," see R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND 
DECISIONS 327, 333-45, 368-70 (1957). 
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plexity eventually reached after a new rule has been in operation will 
be lower than those prevailing under the old. 
6. Formal changes in corporate-shareholder relationships that never- 
theless involve a substantial continuity of ownership in a business 
enterprise shall not be recognized for tax purposes (The non- 
recognition principle) 
Since the time of the capital gains decision, reorganizations (both 
amalgamating and divisive) and incorporating transactions have been 
given nonrecognition treatment. The theory is that the shareholders 
involved, though perhaps realizing gain in a strict constitutional sense, 
do not actually realize the value of their investments, because they do 
not dispose of them but continue them in new and substantially 
similar forms.105 In essence, these nonrecognition rules embody the 
general notion of income tax law that accrued gain must be realized 
before it will be taxed.106 Though certain nonrecognition rules arise 
from particular policy decisions,107 they principally reflect a desire to 
acknowledge for tax purposes a substantial continuity of ownership 
interest. Conceivably, the realization requirement itself, and a fortiori 
many of the Code's particular nonrecognition rules, could be abol- 
ished. But Congress long ago eschewed a simple, extremist position in 
favor of discriminating in many individual contexts between formal 
legal changes in property interests that do, and those that do not, in- 
volve a sufficient discontinuity to trigger recognition of income for 
tax purposes. 
The decision to define nonrecognition transactions induced two 
sets of consequences in the corporate tax culture. The first consists of 
all the cultural products and activities centered around the basic task 
of giving operational content to the nonrecognition decision. Exactly 
which criteria should distinguish the "sale" of a business from a 
"merger"? Exactly which test will give specific content in specific 
contexts to the underlying concept of continuity of interest which is 
at the heart of all nonrecognition transactions? The task is truly 
105. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, ? 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060 (reorganizations, mergers, 
consolidations); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 202(c), 42 Stat. 230 (transfers to con- 
trolled corporations and "reorganizations" as partially defined). Before the introduction 
of I.R.C. ? 355 in 1954, however, divisive transactions had to meet the "reorganization" 
definition to bring any nonrecognition provision into play. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 
852, ? 112(i)(1)(B), 45 Stat. 818. The present statutory provisions are I.R.C. ?? 351-383. 
106. The classic discussion of the realization requirement is the debate between 
Justice Pitney and Justice Brandeis in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
107. E.g., I.R.C. ? 1033 (nonrecognition of gain on involuntary conversions). 
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enormous, given the multiplicity of ways in which businesses can 
operate and the manifold objectives they may serve.'08 
The second set of consequences is of greater conceptual interest. 
The nonrecognition provisions, principally in conjunction with the 
corporate veil decision, have spawned a second class of problematic 
bailouts, the "nonrecognition bailouts." Remarkably, the evolution of 
the law with respect to these bailouts displays aesthetically pleasing 
attributes of completeness and symmetry. By attending in turn to each 
of the major nonrecognition provisions, one can anticipate the corre- 
sponding bailout, and it is with a sense of novelty within a funda- 
mentally familiar rhythm that one learns in each situation of the 
progression of case law development and statutory response. Here, the 
progression of cultural evolution into cumulative doctrinal complexity 
appears at its most dramatic. 
a. Stock Dividends and the Preferred Stock Bailout 
In the celebrated case of Eisner v. Macomber,'09 the Supreme Court 
decided that a dividend of common stock on already outstanding com- 
mon stock was not "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment. Justice Pitney, writing for the Court, reasoned that in- 
come means gain "derived" from labor or capital and that the stock- 
holder's gain in the case before him was not really severed or separated 
(that is, derived) from the original investment; rather, the stockholder 
simply continued the investment, which was now evidenced by new 
pieces of paper."10 This apparently picayune focus on the term "de- 
rived" implies that income taxable to shareholders ordinarily must 
reflect major substantive and major formal changes in their interests, 
that is, both increase in net worth (wealth) and a significant change in 
form. 
Subsequent cases revealed that not all stock dividends were auto- 
matically excluded from income,"' but the basic holding of Macomber 
was not overruled. Hence taxpayers began to exploit the notion that 
receipt of a stock dividend was not recognized for income tax pur- 
poses, and Congress responded with a fairly detailed Code provision 
108. What is involved in trying to operationalize the nonrecognition provisions may 
be grasped by studying Chapters 13, 14, and 16 of BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 
13-1 to 14-152, 16-1 to 16-70; id. (Supp. 1977, no. 2) at S13-1 to S14-46, S16-1 to S16-22; 
interspersed throughout these materials, however, are discussions of issues that fall under 
the second set of consequences identified in the text. 
109. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
110. Id. at 207-11. 
111. See SURREY & WARREN, supra note 3, at 303-07. 
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describing those stock dividends that do and those that do not trigger 
a shareholder-level tax." 2 Tiresomely long regulations govern its ap- 
plication. "3 
The "preferred stock bailout" is one of the more interesting schemes 
that taxpayers devised to take advantage of Macomber. Its purpose is 
to enable common stockholders to extract corporate profits at capital 
gains rates without sacrificing any of their proportionate equity in- 
terests or voting power. A classic version, illustrated by Chamberlin v. 
Commissioner," 4 involves three steps. First, the corporation declares 
a preferred stock dividend on its common shares. Taxpayers, relying 
on Macomber's nonrecognition principle, treat it as a nontaxable stock 
dividend. Next, after satisfying the holding period requirement for 
long-term capital gains treatment,"15 they sell the preferred stock to 
an outside investor seeking a steady return, often to a financial in- 
termediary such as an insurance company."" Relying on the corporate 
veil decision, they report their gain as capital gain. Finally, after the 
insurance company has received dividend income for a prearranged 
number of years, the corporation redeems the preferred stock at ap- 
proximately the same price the insurance company paid; this produces 
112. I.R.C. ? 305. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, ? 421, 83 Stat. 
614 (amending I.R.C. ? 305), responded to various abuses involving stock dividends 
by effecting major changes in the 1954 Code. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
150-53 (1969) (tracing history of tax avoidance schemes and Treasury and congressional 
responses). A major target of the 1969 changes was the practice whereby some publicly 
held corporations made periodic redemption offers to shareholders in lieu of dividends. 
These plans were tantamount to giving shareholders the option to take a cash distribu- 
tion (by accepting the offer and surrendering some shares for redemption) or to increase 
their proportionate interests in the business (by refusing the offer). This was functionally 
equivalent to an option to take either a cash dividend or a stock dividend. Id. at 151. 
See generally Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the 
Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739 (1969). Since the latter option was tax- 
able, the 1969 changes made it possible to tax the periodic redemption scheme as well. 
I.R.C. ? 305(c); Treas. Reg. ? 1.305-3(e), Example (9) (1973, as amended 1974). 
113. Treas. Reg. ?? 1.305-1 to 1.305-2 (1973), 1.305-3 (1973, as amended 1974), 1.305-4 
(1973), 1.305-5 (1973, as amended 1974), 1.305-6 to 1.305-8 (1973). 
114. 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954). 
115. At present, the required holding period is nine months for taxable years beginning 
in 1977, and is one year thereafter. I.R.C. ? 1222. But because the basis of the dividend 
stock is derived by allocating to it a part of the basis of the old stock, id. ? 307(a), the 
shareholders can count the period during which they held the old stock. Id. ? 1223(5). 
Thus they might qualify for long-term capital gains treatment even if they sell the 
dividend stock immediately. But see id. ? 306 (discussed at p. 120 infra). This alloca- 
tion of basis and tacking on of holding periods is, of course, merely a way of carrying 
out the theme of the nonrecognition provision, that the stock dividend, while involving 
a formal change, essentially amounts only to a continuation of an ownership interest in 
property. 
116. Life insurance companies often have much lower effective tax rates for dividend 
income than do individuals. See Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Financial In- 
termediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1637-57 (1975). 
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no gain or loss to the latter." 7 Obviously, a common stock dividend 
could not be used without an unwanted sacrifice of proportionate in- 
terest in residual earnings and voting power. 
The taxpayers' strategy succeeded in the Chamberlin case. In 1954, 
one year later, Congress consciously responded" 8 by enacting mecha- 
nistic provisions to deal with preferred stock bailouts."19 Interestingly, 
Congress chose in effect to make an exception to the corporate veil 
decision.120 Receipt of a preferred stock dividend on common stock 
would continue to be a nonrecognized transaction,'2' but the preferred 
stock would be "tainted," so that if later sold it would normally 
produce ordinary income to the seller. More precisely, the seller must 
include in ordinary income the amount that would have been dividend 
income if the corporation, instead of paying a preferred stock dividend, 
had distributed money equal to the fair market value of the preferred 
stock.'22 This basically simple, mechanical rule had to be qualified in 
a variety of ways,'23 because of the various legitimate uses of preferred 
stock dividends.'24 
b. Corporate Divisions and the Divisive Bailout 
Suppose that an antitrust decree forces an oil company to separate 
its pipeline operations from its oil producing business. It does so by 
means of a "spin-off," transferring the pipeline division's assets to a 
newly created subsidiary and distributing the subsidiary's stock to its 
own shareholders. After the transaction, the shareholders continue 
their ownership interests in the two businesses, though of course the 
paper evidencing their equity claims is now different. Early cases such 
as Rockefeller v. United States125 held that the distribution of such a 
117. Taxpayers, of course, could vary the basic pattern described in the text; the 
second and third steps, for example, could be collapsed by having the distributing 
corporation later redeem the dividend stock from the original distributees. I.R.C. ? 306 
(a)(2) deals with this variation of the preferred stock bailout. 
118. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 241-46 (1954) (discussing Chamberlin 
and ways of closing loophole of preferred stock bailout). 
119. I.R.C. ? 306. 
120. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1954) (under new ? 306, "the 
original recipient of the dividend stock is, in general, taxed on its disposition as if there 
had been a cash, rather than a stock, distribution to him in the first instance"). 
121. The various exceptions to the general rule that stock dividends are not taxable 
do not include the case of a simple dividend of preferred on common stock. See I.R.C. 
?? 305(a) (general rule), (b), (c) (exceptions). 
122. Id. ? 306(a)(1)(A). 
123. Id. ? 306(b). 
124. See Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal In- 
come Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
11-14 (1952); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 241-46 (1954). 
125. 257 U.S. 176 (1921). 
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"spun-off" subsidiary's shares to the original company's shareholders 
should be recognized as a taxable transaction. The cases were decided 
in the absence of express statutory treatment of spin-offs, and they 
prompted Congress to legislate that such corporate separations be 
given nonrecognition treatment.126 The rationale behind Congress's 
action was that such divisions were mere business readjustments under- 
taken for good nontax reasons.'27 In the typical manner of such 
developments, the language of the early legislation was simple.'28 
Taxpayers soon thought to combine this nonrecognition provision 
with the corporate veil decision. They devised the "divisive bailout," 
which typically involves a corporation (X) that has prospered but has 
accumulated earnings instead of paying them out as dividends. Sup- 
pose that X has invested most of the retained earnings in marketable 
securities issued by other entities. The shareholders of X are con- 
cerned that an accumulated earnings tax may be imposed if the market- 
able securities are not somehow taken out of the corporation. Instead 
of having X pay them out as dividends in kind, taxable as ordinary 
income, they employ a tax-free spin-off. They cause X to transfer the 
marketable securities to a newly formed, wholly owned subsidiary (S) 
as a nontaxable contribution to capital or in a nontaxable exchange 
of assets for S stock.129 All the shares in S are then distributed to the X 
shareholders. The latter hope that receipt of the S shares is nontax- 
able as part of a nonrecognized corporate division. They then sell the 
S shares to an outsider (B) who wants the marketable securities. The 
126. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, ?? 203(c), (h)(1)(B), 43 Stat. 256-57. 
127. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924) (intent to harmonize treat- 
ment of spin-offs with that of split-ups). The prior law's partial definition of a "re- 
organization" (which qualified for nonrecognition treatment) did not clearly cover a 
transfer of property by one corporation to another, immediately after which the first 
corporation or its stockholders (or both) were in control of the transferee corporation (a 
"spin-off"). See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230 ("reorganization" 
includes (1) merger or consolidation, (2) recapitalization, and (3) mere change in identity, 
form or place of incorporation). The legislative history of the 1924 statute describes 
spin-offs as a "common type of reorganization" that "clearly" should be included in the 
provisions for nonrecognition of corporate reorganizations. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 
1st Sess. 16 (1924). 
128. Compare Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, ?? 203(c), (h)(1)(B), 43 Stat. 256-57 (several 
paragraphs relatings to divisions) with, e.g., I.R.C. ?? 368(a)(1)(D), 355, 356, 358, 362 
(current Code provisions relating to divisions). 
129. When a shareholder contributes new capital to his corporation, he simply in- 
creases the amount of his investment and therefore has no taxable gain. Even when he 
receives new shares in exchange for the property contributed, any gain he may have is 
not recognized if he is in control of the corporation after the transfer, since in that case 
he will have sufficient continuity of interest in the transferred property to warrant non- 
recognition. I.R.C. ? 351. See p. 125 infra. Gain or loss to the transferee corpora- 
tion is not recognized when it issues stock in exchange for contributed property. Id. 
? 1032(a). 
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X shareholders hope to receive capital gains treatment on the sale'30 
by virtue of the corporate veil decision. B then liquidates S in order to 
get the marketable securities. Assuming that he has paid a fair price 
for the S stock, he will have no gain or loss on the liquidation and 
thus is not concerned that a liquidation is a taxable transaction. The 
selling shareholders, despite their favorable tax treatment, have not 
sacrificed their proportionate interests in the real business of X. 
The landmark case of Helvering v. Gregory131 involved essentially 
this sequence of events. To defeat the divisive bailout, both the circuit 
court and the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between true 
corporate divisions that deserved nonrecognition treatment (e.g., 
Rockefeller), and disguised corporate dividends that should be taxed 
as ordinary income (e.g., Gregory). They rose to the task and created 
one of the most protean judicial doctrines in the tax law:'32 because 
the spin-off lacked a "business purpose," it would not qualify as a non- 
taxable corporate division within the intention of the statute. Gregory 
did not modify the corporate veil decision, as did Congress's response 
to the preferred stock bailout, by "tainting" the spun-off stock to deny 
it the status of a capital asset for purposes of later sale or redemption. 
Rather, it modified the nonrecognition decision itself by enunciating 
a precondition for its application. This suggests that the facial plau- 
sibility of a variety of remedial approaches to a problem injects a 
measure of indeterminancy into cultural evolution. 
Congress quickly reacted to the Gregory case by reducing all spin- 
offs to the status of ordinary distributions, an extreme position from 
which it later retreated.'33 Gregory's uncertain and amorphous business 
purpose doctrine persisted, and later, in order to ameliorate the at- 
tendant insecurity in the tax culture, Congress enacted yet more Code 
provisions in an effort to mechanize the rules for preventing the 
divisive bailout while permitting nonrecognition of legitimate cor- 
130. Because of the Code's principle of tacking on the holding period when stock 
basis is allocated to new stock, see note 115 supra, the shareholders might be able to 
sell their S shares immediately. Besides receiving capital gains treatment, they may also 
offset some of their old basis in the X stock against the gain on sale of S shares. See 
I.R.C. ? 358(b)(2), (c); id. ? 1223(l)(B). 
131. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
132. See generally Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax 
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968). 
133. Before the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal of the Tax 
Court's decision in favor of Mrs. Gregory, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d 
Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), Congress had enacted a provision reducing spin-offs 
to ordinary distributions. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 13-6. In 1951 Congress 
relented and provided for tax-free spin-offs under certain conditions. Revenue Act of 
1951, ch. 521, ? 317(a), 65 Stat. 493. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 13-6 to 13-7. 
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porate divisions.134 It did not, however, obviate the business purpose 
doctrine; the latter is still used as a judicial safeguard against transac- 
tions that conform to the letter but not to the reason of the law.135 
The current statutory result is notable principally for its requirement 
that the distributing company and the company whose stock is dis- 
tributed both be engaged, immediately after the distribution, in an 
active trade or business with at least a five-year operating history.136 
This requirement and the other rules of the section have in turn 
produced an ample harvest of case law.137 
c. Combinatory Reorganizations and Recapitalizations 
and the Security Bailout 
A simple recapitalization-a reshuffling for good business reasons of 
the capital structure of a single corporation-has long been considered 
a nonrecognition transaction.'38 Treating the combination by merger 
of two previously unrelated businesses as a nonrecognition transaction 
involves greater conceptual boldness and a more liberal tax policy. 
Though it is true that in a simple merger139 shareholders of each 
merging corporation continue in new form their interest in their old 
corporation's business enterprise, it is also true that they acquire for 
the first time an interest in the business enterprise of the other 
corporation. Concurrently, they lose part of their interest in their 
original corporation's business, for they now must share it with share- 
holders of the other corporation. But the degree of continuity of 
interest in mergers apparently satisfied Congress, for it decided to 
treat both statutory and practical mergers as nonrecognition transac- 
tions.140 The temptations to taxpayers accordingly multiplied. 
Since exchange of stock or securities for other stock or securities of 
one's own corporation (in a recapitalization) or of another corporation 
a party to a reorganization (for example, a merger) were to be non- 
taxable transactions,'4' some taxpayers hit upon the idea of the "secu- 
134. Compare the language of Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ? 112(b)(11) (spin-off 
provision enacted by Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, ? 317(a), 65 Stat. 493) with the more 
elaborate provisions of I.R.C. ? 355. See also Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962) (extended historical review and analysis of I.R.C. ? 112(b)(11)). 
135. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, sutpra note 3, at 13-36 to 13-38. 
136. I.R.C. ? 355(a), (b). 
137. See Annot., [1977] 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) TT 2517.05-.93 (1976). 
138. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230. 
139. By "simple merger" is meant one in which all common shareholders of the 
merging corporation receive nothing but common shares of the surviving corporation, the 
old common shareholders of which continue to be common shareholders in the survivor. 
140. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230. 
141. Id. 
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rity bailout." Consider, for example, a simplified version of the facts 
in the well-known case of Bazley v. Conmmissioner.'42 A close corpora- 
tion has a large amount of accumulated earnings and profits. The 
sole shareholder adopts a plan of "recapitalization," according to 
which he exchanges all his common stock for new common stock and 
bonds. He treats the exchange as a nonrecognition transaction. He 
later either sells the bonds, has them redeemed, or waits until the 
principal amount is repaid at maturity, and claims capital gains treat- 
ment on the net proceeds.'43 After these transactions, the shareholder 
will continue to have the same proportionate interest in the residual 
earnings of the enterprise and the same voting power; he will not have 
made the usual sacrifice needed for a permissible bailout. 
In the Bazley case, Justice Frankfurter dealt with this scheme by 
accepting the Tax Court's conclusion that the transaction was merely 
a vehicle for conveying earnings and profits out of the corporation.'44 
It was therefore not a "reorganization" within the meaning and pur- 
pose of the income tax statute, but rather a taxable transaction. He 
observed that had the taxpayers caused their corporation to issue the 
debentures directly, the distribution clearly would have been taxable, 
and that the result should not be different merely because the deben- 
ture dividend was folded into an unrelated modification of the capital 
accounts.145 
Inevitably, Congress moved to codify a more concrete barrier to the 
security bailout.'46 Instead of endorsing the Bazley Court's finding 
that in effect the scheme was not a legitimate "reorganization," it 
enacted a mechanized variation, which provides that if a reorganization 
exchange involves receipt of securities having a principal amount in 
excess of the principal amount of securities given up (if any), then the 
excess principal amount will be treated as taxable boot to the recip- 
ient. Ordinarily, the boot will be taxed as ordinary income to the ex- 
142. 331 U.S. 737 (1947). 
143. For the basis of the bonds received in the recapitalization, see Revenue Act of 
1921, ch. 136, ? 202(d), 42 Stat. 230 (current version at I.R.C. ? 358(a)(1), (b)(1)). In essence, 
the shareholder's basis in his old shares is neither increased nor decreased as a result of 
the transaction, and the total basis is transferred to the new stock and bonds and 
allocated among them. Since by hypothesis the shareholder's total investment has in- 
creased greatly in value, the market value (and face value) of the new bonds will sub- 
stantially exceed their basis. Thus, when the bonds are sold or redeemed, the share- 
holder will have taxable gain, which is, however, generally capital gain. See id. ? 1232 
(a)(l), (2)(A). 
144. 331 U.S. at 743. 
145. Id. at 742. 
146. I.R.C. ?? 354(a)(2), 356(d) (originally enacted as Internal Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 
1, ?? 354(a)(2), 356(d), 68A Stat. 112, 115-16). 
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tent of the distributing company's earnings and profits.'47 The rule 
applies to reorganizations generally, not just to recapitalizations. 
d. Incorporations and the Liquidation-Reincorporation Bailout 
Transfers by shareholders to a newly formed corporation, or to one 
already in business, in exchange for stock or securities of the corpora- 
tion have long been treated as nonrecognition transactions when the 
transferors have control of the corporation immediately after the 
transfer.148 Again, the control test reflects the continuity of interest 
notion: when the transferors' ownership interest in the corporation is 
quite large, they can be deemed "in substance" to be continuing their 
interest in the transferred assets and merely changing the form of their 
ownership.'49 
As might be expected, some taxpayers combined an expression of 
the corporate veil decision with an incorporating transaction to 
produce an attractive bailout. One important procedure they developed 
might be called the straightforwardly version of the "liquidation- 
reincorporation bailout." In this scheme, the manifestation of the veil 
principle that is used is the complete liquidation provision. In the 
most blatant example, a corporation possessing excess cash, substantial 
earnings and profits, and depreciable operating assets, some of which 
have appreciated greatly in value, completely liquidates. Under sec- 
tion 331, which brings liquidations under the corporate veil principle, 
taxpayer-shareholders pay a capital gains tax on the difference between 
the value of what they receive in liquidation and the basis of their 
stock.'5' In return for this, however, they achieve three significant tax 
147. See I.R.C. ?? 356(a)(2), (b), (d). Section 356(a)(2) provides that gain upon ex- 
change will be treated as a dividend if the exchange "has the effect of the distribution 
of a dividend." In interpreting this provision, courts have focused on such factors as the 
existence of corporate earnings and profits, the pro rata nature of the distribution of 
"boot," and the effect on the shareholder's proportionate ownership interests. See SURREY 
& WARREN, supra note 3, at 815 (citing cases). See generally id. at 810-27. 
148. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, ? 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 230 (current version at I.R.C. 
? 351). 
149. See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 
181, 188-89 (provisions designed to facilitate business "readjustments," also to increase 
revenues "by preventing [taxpayers] from taking colorable losses . . . in fictitious ex- 
changes"); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940) (purpose of 
control test to prevent recognition where there has been "mere change in the form of 
ownership" but not real cashing in of gain or closing out of losing venture). 
150. The scheme described in the text is termed "straightforward" because it literally 
involves a liquidation and a reincorporation in that temporal sequence. Related schemes 
turn on the bailout possibilities of liquidations and the nonrecognition treatment af- 
forded transfers to controlled corporations, but are less obvious. See note 156 infra. 
151. I.R.C. ? 331 (total amount received in liquidation treated as though received in 
exchange for stock). 
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objectives. The excess cash is in their hands, ready to be spent, with- 
out their having paid an ordinary income tax. The corporation's earn- 
ings and profits account has been eliminated because the corporation 
has ceased to exist.'52 And after distribution, the depreciable assets are 
valued at fair market value for depreciation purposes, even though 
only a capital gains tax has been paid as the price of the step-up in 
basis.'-53 As tax practitioners well know, the present cost of the capital 
gains tax may be outweighed by the discounted present value of the 
tax savings that results from the extra depreciation deductions made 
possible by the step-up in basis. Typically, this will occur when the 
assets are relatively short-lived, the business's tax rate is reasonably 
high, and the business is expected to generate sufficient profits for 
the deductions to be usable.'54 Having reaped the benefits of complete 
liquidation, the shareholders can simply reincorporate in a non- 
recognized transaction;155 they transfer the operating assets but not 
the cash to a newly formed corporation in exchange for its stock. They 
can then continue their business as if nothing had happened except 
the receipt of tax advantages.'56 Ritual and prayer are thus employed 
152. Eliminating the "earnings and profits" account from an enterprise's tax-account- 
ing records is valuable because the account represents potential ordinary income tax 
liability to the shareholders: except as otherwise provided (e.g., in liquidations), distribu- 
tions are deemed to come out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and dis- 
tributions out of earnings and profits are dividends taxable at ordinary rates. See pp. 
100-01 & note 36 supra. 
153. I.R.C. ?? 331, 334(a), 336. That there is only one capital gains tax on distributions 
of appreciated property depends upon the seventh (General Utilities) principle, as ex- 
pressed in id. ? 336. See pp. 130-35 infra. The description of the liquidation-rein- 
corporation scheme in the text thus invokes that principle as well as the fifth and sixth. 
But notice that because of the first two tax objectives, the scheme might be very worth- 
while even if the values of the assets were exactly equal to their bases. The advantage of 
obtaining a step-up in asset bases is mentioned at this point only to give a sense of the 
full tax-avoidance potential of the scheme. 
154. Other versions of the liquidation-reincorporation bailout become available when 
the taxpayers do not seek a step-up in asset bases. For example, there might be a transfer 
of operating assets to a new subsidiary (nonrecognized, see I.R.C. ? 351 & notes 148-49 
supra), followed by liquidation of the parent; shareholders of the latter receive both 
the excess cash and stock in the subsidiary, which now conducts the business. See example 
(3) in note 156 infra. 
155. I.R.C. ? 351. See p. 125 & note 149 supra. 
156. It may help to contemplate some numerical hypotheticals. Suppose that X 
Corporation has the following tax balance sheet: 
Assets 
Cash $40 
Operating Assets (basis) 60 
Liabilities 
Legal Capital $50 
Earnings & profits 50 
The cash is not necessary for the operations of the company. The sole shareholder (S) 
has a basis in his stock of $60. The fair market value of the operating assets is $80. 
(1) Straightforward Liquidation-Reincorporation. (a) X Corporation liquidates. S pays 
a capital gains tax on $60, the difference between the value of what he received ($80 of 
assets + $40 cash) and the basis in his stock ($60). I.R.C. ? 331. The operating assets now 
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to earn indulgences from one's appointed stay in the tax law's purga- 
tory. It was a marvelous idea indeed. If the device were permitted to 
work, then any going concern in corporate form would be free to 
absolve itself, from time to time, of its profit-blighting tax attributes 
at a relatively inexpensive cost. And it could do so without actually 
ceasing to do business in the corporate form or affecting its share- 
holders' continuing interests in the business.'57 
have a basis of $80. Id. ? 334(a). X pays no tax. Id. ? 336. (b) S then transfers the 
operating assets but not the cash to newly formed Y Corporation, in return for all its 
stock. The transfer is not taxed, id. ? 351; Y's basis in the assets is $80, id. ? 362(a)(1); 
and S's basis in the Y stock is $80, id. ? 358(a). If S had reached the same pretax economic 
result by the nondevious route of simply having X distribute the cash, he would have 
paid an ordinary income tax on $40, and the operating assets would have kept their 
low basis of $60. 
(2) Section 337 Sale-and-Liquidation Variant. (a) S forms Y Corporation and contributes 
$80 for its stock. The transaction is not taxed. Id. ? 351. Alternatively, Y may be a pre- 
existing brother corporation of X that has accumulated both excess cash and earnings 
and profits of $80, which S desires to bail out along with X's $40 of cash. (b) X adopts a 
plan of complete liquidation and sells all the operating assets to Y for $80. The sale is 
not taxed. Id. ? 337. Like id. ? 336, see note 153 supra, this section stems from the 
seventh principle. See pp. 130-35 infra. (c) X then distributes its assets, which are 
now all in the form of cash (the original $40 and the $80 received for the operating 
assets), in liquidation. S pays a capital gains tax on $60 (X's $120 of cash minus S's $60 
basis). I.R.C. ? 331. Y has a cost basis of $80 for the X assets. The tax results here are 
the same as in example (1). Note that the $80 pumped into Y comes right back to S; he 
therefore might arrange a temporary and quite safe loan to effectuate the scheme. If the 
$80 represented past earnings of Y, then the amount of tax avoidance is even greater; in 
effect, Y's cash, as well as X's, is bailed out, even though the tax burden is the same 
as in example (1). 
(3) Transfer-to-Subsidiary-and-Liquidatioz Variant. Assume now that the fair market 
value of X's operating assets is $30, significantly less than their basis ($60). S still wants 
to bail out the cash. But he will not want a stepdown in the basis of the operating assets, 
so long as the negative present value of the decrease in future depreciation deductions is 
greater than the tax savings from reduction of his capital gain on liquidation-from $60, 
as in examples (1) and (2), to $10 ($30 of assets + $40 cash - $60 stock basis), as in this 
example if the straightforward scheme were employed. So S concocts a new, and purer, 
scheme. (a) X transfers all its operating assets but not the cash, to a newly formed, 
wholly owned subsidiary (Y) in exchange for all of Y's stock. The transaction is not taxed. 
Id. ? 351. (Again, Y could be a preexisting subsidiary.) Y takes X's high basis of $60 in 
the operating assets. Id. ? 362(a). (b) X then liquidates and distributes the Y stock and 
$40 to S. S pays a capital gains tax on $10 ($30, the value of the Y stock, plus $40, the 
cash, minus $60, S's basis in the X stock). Id. ?? 331, 334. It should be obvious that when 
the value of the assets has fallen below their bases, the taxpayer will always prefer this 
scheme to the straightforward one, even when the tax trade-offs make the latter a 
better course than doing nothing, because this third scheme will trigger the same 
present tax cost but will not result in a step-down in asset bases. 
The above discussion assumes, of course, that none of the schemes would be attacked 
successfully by the Service. 
157. The reader may have noted that the tax advantages of the first two schemes 
described in the preceding footnote do not depend upon the nonrecognition rule of I.R.C. 
? 351 (transfers to controlled corporations), which was invoked in all three examples. In 
the first scheme ("straightforward liquidation-reincorporation"), the assets transferred to 
the new corporation received (at the time of liquidation) a step-up in basis to fair market 
value. Consequently, taxing the exchange of assets for the new company's stock would not 
change the result, since the transferring individual would simply have no gain. Similarly, 
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Unfortunately for taxpayers, the courts were not disposed to take 
all of this passively. By applying sheer willpower to the task of con- 
torting statutory language in five or six different places, they have 
managed to categorize some liquidation-reincorporation sequences as 
so-called "D" reorganizations.'58 Such reorganizations qualify for non- 
in example (2) ("section 337 sale-and-liquidation variant"), the $80 contribution for new 
stock would produce no gain to the shareholder, even if it were recognized for tax pur- 
poses. The taxpayer's objective in the third example ("transfer to subsidiary-and-liquida- 
tion variant"), however, would be defeated if ? 351 did not apply, for only nonrecognition 
prevents a stepdown in basis of the property transferred to the subsidiary. 
These reflections prompt a second look at the propriety of calling the liquidation- 
reincorporation schemes "nonrecognition bailouts." The first two schemes, unlike the 
third, depend not upon nonrecognition of incorporating transactions, but upon the deci- 
sions to assimilate liquidations to stock sales and to step up the basis of distributed 
property to its full fair market value even when the distributed has been taxed only at 
capital gains rates. From a more revealing perspective, however, all three schemes result 
from the Code's failure to provide appropriate nonrecognition treatment for all series 
of transactions involving substantial continuity of ownership interest. The real fault lies 
in the reorganization provisions, which of course are nonrecognition provisions; they fail 
to encompass explicitly all the events that, in view of their underlying rationale, they 
should cover. See note 158 infra (discussing resulting problems and judicial attempts to 
cope with this de facto (but presumably unintended) electiveness of nonrecognition rules 
by classifying schemes as "D" or "F" reorganizations, which are nonrecognized but sub- 
ject to rules that eliminate tax avoidance). In this light, "nonrecognition bailouts" is an 
appropriate term for the liquidation-reincorporation schemes. 
158. A "D" reorganization is defined as 
a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if 
immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders 
(including persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any 
combination thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are trans- 
ferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation 
to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies 
under section 354, 355, or 356 .... 
I.R.C. ? 368(a)(1)(D). Sections 354, 355, and 356 specify the conditions for nonrecognition 
treatment of the distribution of stock or securities in the transferee corporation to the 
shareholders of the transferor corporation. If the liquidation-reincorporation sequence of 
example (1) in note 156 supra is successfully characterized as a 'D' reorganization, the 
adverse consequences noted in the text will follow. But to invalidate the bailout ex- 
emplified by the example (1) sequence by resort to the statutory provisions, a court 
must overcome substantial barriers. 
(1) Section 368(a)(1)(D) speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another. 
But, if the scheme is taken at face value, it is S, not X, who makes the transfer to Y. A 
court could respond that X "indirectly" or "in substance" made the transfer, and that S 
served as a mere "conduit." 
(2) Section 368(a)(1)(D) requires that the transferor (now assumed to be X) or its share- 
holders (S) be in "control" (80%, see id. ? 368(c)) of the transferee immediately after the 
transfer. But S, if he were as cleverly advised as some actual taxpayers, might arrange 
to have outside investors buy 21% of all the stock to be issued by Y, prior to the transfer 
of X's operating assets to Y for the other 797% of Y stock. This clearly evades the statu- 
tory definition. 
(3) Section 368(a)(1)(D) also requires that, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities 
of the transferee corporation (Y) be "distributed" in a transaction qualifying under I.R.C. 
?? 354, 355, or 356. The context and ordinary Code usage of the term "distributed" imply 
a distributor other than Y (Y is said to "issue" its own shares), and in this case the only 
candidate is X. But X has not distributed Y's shares. A court could respond that the 
transaction was virtually the same as if X were technically a distributor. 
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recognition treatment, but the specific consequences of nonrecognition 
vitiate the advantages of the bailout scheme: the excess cash that the 
shareholders receive in the liquidation-reincorporation game is con- 
sidered either taxable boot or a functionally unrelated distribution of 
cash from a continuing business; the earnings and profits account of 
the "liquidated" corporation is not destroyed but carries over to the 
new legal entity; and the basis of the operating assets likewise carries 
over unchanged.'59 But taxpayers, predictably, did not give up so 
easily. They devised new versions of the liquidation-reincorporation 
bailout and worked diligently at disguising and complicating all the 
simple variations.'60 The resultant body of case law161 is somewhat 
grotesque but vaguely titillating. If the pattern displayed in the other 
(4) Fitting this constructive distribution of Y shares by X under ? 355 is impossible 
because of the active business requirements of that section, see id. ? 355(b). Section 356 
applies only if the transaction would qualify under ? 354 or ? 355 but for the distribu- 
tion of boot, see id. ? 356(a)(1)(A). Thus the constructive distribution must qualify, if at 
all, under ? 354. This section requires an exchange (by the shareholder in the transferor 
corporation) of stock or securities in one corporation for those of another pursuant to 
the reorganization. Id. ? 354(a)(1). S, however, exchanged assets, not X stock, for the Y 
stock. A court might say that, when the steps of the scheme are viewed as a whole, or in 
terms of their net result, there was such an exchange. 
(5) Section 354(b)(1) requires in the case of a "D" reorganization that Y acquire "sub- 
stantially all of the assets" of the constructive transferor, X. But Y did not acquire X's 
$40 of cash, which is substantial ia relation to the operating assets (valued at $80). A 
court might interpret the statute to mean "substantially all of the operating assets"-a 
move that would give it trouble in the ordinary reorganization case, in which the Service 
often argues quite rightly that a challenged transaction does not deserve nonrecognition 
treatment. Alternatively, a court might say that the liquidating distribution of cash 
must be deemed a functionally unrelated cash dividend paid by X prior to the construc- 
tive transfer of operating assets to Y. 
(6) Section 354(b)(1)(B) requires that the Y stock "received by such transferor" (i.e., X) 
be distributed in pursuance of the plan. This might be read to imply that X must in 
fact have received some Y stock. A court might answer that there was constructive receipt, 
or that the language should be read without such implication, as if it said "the stock 
received by such transferor (if any) ...." 
The above analysis presents a rather full listing of the problems raised by a careful, 
literal reading of the statute. In practice, courts have exhibited varying degrees of 
thoroughness when responding to, sliding over, or confusing these problems in order to 
frustrate liquidation-reincorporation bailouts. See, e.g., Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 
F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947); Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967) (both D and F reorganization found). See generally 
Hjorth, Liquidations and Reincorporations-Before and After Davant, 42 WASH. L. REV. 
737 (1967); Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed? 
77 HARV. L. REV. 1218 (1964). 
159. See I.R.C. ? 356(a)(2) (dividend treatment of boot); id. ? 381(c)(2) (earnings and 
profits carryover); id. ? 362(b) (basis carryover); SURREY & WARREN, supra note 3, at 921- 
24 (discussion of cases dealing with possibility of viewing distributed cash as "functionally 
unrelated" to reorganization). 
160. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 
(1967), provides a magnificent example. The taxpayers used the basic pattern discussed in 
example (2) in note 156 supra, but complicated it by injecting a straw-man intermediary. 
161. See Annot., [1977] 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) T 2551.2694 (1976). 
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three nonrecognition areas holds true, the next major step will be an 
attempted legislative solution to the liquidation-reincorporation prob- 
lem. Barring developments that might moot the problem,'62 this step, 
by all precedent, should occur. 
7. Corporate distributions in kind shall not create taxable gain or 
loss to the corporation (The General Utilities principle) 
In 1935, in the fateful case of General Utilities & Operating Co. v. 
Helvering,163 the Supreme Court decided that a certain dividend dis- 
tribution of appreciated property did not result in taxable gain to the 
distributing corporation. Closely read, the opinion does little more 
than reject the argument that when a corporation declares a dividend 
in a specified dollar amount and then pays it by distributing appre- 
ciated property of equivalent value, it realizes income by virtue of the 
doctrine that a discharge of indebtedness yields income.'64 Courts, 
however, soon interpreted the case as standing for the broader "Gen- 
eral Utilities principle" expressed above.'65 The effects of the holding 
upon the corporate tax culture, hardly foreseeable by the Supreme 
Court in 1935, have been great. 
The eventual statutory embodiments of the decision represent its 
first set of consequences. After years of vigorous but usually unsuc- 
cessful attempts by the Service to prevent judicial application of the 
principle,'66 Congress, in the 1954 Code, adopted it not only for dis- 
tributions from continuing businesses but also for liquidating distribu- 
tions.'67 Both provisions are overburdened with exceptional68 and are 
explicitly subject to various depreciation recapture and other recap- 
ture rules.'69 In addition, the courts, in wavering and uncertain 
162. Full-scale integration of the corporate and individual income taxes to eliminate 
the double tax on corporate-source income, together with elimination of the capital gains 
preference, would be one example. 
163. 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
164. Id. at 204, 206. The Commissioner sought to tax as income to the corporation 
the difference between its basis in the property distributed (stock in another corporation, 
acquired at $.10 per share) and the value of the property when distributed ($56.125 per 
share). Id. at 201, 203. 
165. See SURREY & WARREN, supra note 3, at 344. 
166. Id.; BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 7-40. 
167. I.R.C. ?? 311 (continuing businesses), 336 (liquidations). 
168. Section 311 contains elaborate- exceptions for distributions involving "last-in, 
first-out" (LIFO) inventory, liabilities in excess of the basis of the distributed property, 
and appreciated property used to redeem stock; sections 311 and 336 both incorporate the 
? 453(d) exception for installment obligations. 
169. When depreciation deductions or other amortizations of the purchase price of 
property have been taken at an accelerated rate by virtue of provisions such as id. ? 167 
(b)(2), (b)(3), (k), the Code often specifies that the sale or other disposition of the 
property will cause part of the previously deducted amounts to be included-"recaptured" 
is the tax jargon-in the seller's income. See, e.g., id. ?? 1245, 1250. 
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fashion, have applied certain judicially created doctrines from other 
areas of tax law to distributions in kind.'70 Moreover, the provision 
governing liquidations has given rise to yet another taxpayer scheme: 
under the not infrequently successful "straddle" technique, a corpora- 
tion that wishes to liquidate sells its depreciated property in order to 
recognize a loss in its last taxable year, but keeps its appreciated 
property for distribution in kind to the shareholders; the corporation 
thereby avoids recognition of the gain on such property.'7' 
The second set of consequences grew directly from the courts' adop- 
tion of the General Utilities principle. Applying the rule to liquida- 
tions required a distinction between sales made by the corporation, 
which would be taxable to it, and sales made by the shareholders after 
receiving the property in liquidation, which would invoke no tax at 
the corporate level. Attempts to draw this distinction proved quite 
difficult in concrete situations'72 and underscored the arbitrariness 
and potential unfairness of making the tax treatment depend upon 
whether the shareholders were sufficiently well advised to follow the 
magically correct temporal sequence. Congress, again responding to a 
problem with mechanical rules, enacted a provision that makes it 
generally irrelevant whether the corporate assets were sold before or 
after dissolution and liquidation.'73 The section provides roughly that 
the corporation shall not realize gain or loss on sales of property 
within the twelve-month period following the adoption of a plan of 
complete liquidation. But the ghost was not neatly exorcised, for it 
was thought necessary to have exceptions or special rules for inventory 
not sold in bulk, installment obligations, collapsible corporations, 
liquidations of subsidiaries, and certain minority shareholders.174 More- 
170. See, e.g., Commissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948) (decided prior to enactment of I.R.C. ? 311) (anticipatory- 
assignment-of-income doctrine applied to avoid application of General Utilities principle), 
followed in Commissioner v. First State Bank of Matador, 172 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1949) 
(per curiam); Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 446-48 
(1975), appeal docketed, No. 76-2496 (6th Cir., Aug. 4, 1976) (tax benefit rule applied to 
straight liquidation of subsidiary, despite I.R.C. ? 336). But cf. Commissioner v. South 
Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1963) (I.R.C. ? 336 mandates nonrecognition 
of gain, despite "windfall" and despite id. ? 446(b), which authorizes government re- 
computations of taxpayers income using accounting methods that will "clearly reflect 
income"). 
171. Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.9d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), is an in- 
famous straddle case. 
172. Comnpare Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (formal sale 
by stockholders taxable as actual sale by corporation) withs United States v. Cumberland 
Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (sale by stockholders not taxable as sale by dissolved 
corporation). 
173. Internal Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, ? 337, 68A Stat. 106 (current version at 
I.R.C. ? 337). 
174. I.R.C. ? 337(b), (c). Collapsible corporations arc discussed at pp. 132-35 infra. 
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over, because the twelve-month period begins to run only after the 
occurrence of a formal event-the adoption of a plan-it is practically 
elective for taxpayers and thus has generated its own straddling tech- 
nique.175 Perhaps because of the tax-avoidance possibilities it presents, 
it too has become subject to various exceptions.1"6 
A final consequence of the General Utilities principle is that, in con- 
junction with the corporate veil principle, it has generated a third kind 
of problematic bailout, the "General Utilities bailout." The General 
Utilities notion as embodied in the Code'77 enables individual tax- 
payers, upon liquidation of their corporations, to obtain the apprecia- 
tion in value of corporate assets at the cost of only a capital gains tax 
at the shareholder level, even though the stepped-up basis of some 
distributed property may be used to offset future ordinary income. To 
simplify somewhat, the principle may enable the bailout of future 
income, not just past, already taxed income.'78 
The most shocking example of this abuse of the General Utilities 
principle is the collapsible corporation; one might even call this third 
kind of bailout the collapsible bailout. To take a simple example, con- 
sider a liquor dealer who wants to purchase a special whiskey, hold it 
while it appreciates in value, and then sell it to retailers at a sub- 
stantial profit. If he did this as a sole proprietor, sales proceeds in 
excess of cost and expenses would be taxed as ordinary income. If he 
operated in a normal corporation, he would either resort to the con- 
ventional retained earnings strategy or bear the typical double tax. 
Instead, the dealer forms a new corporation to which he contributes 
the funds to purchase the whiskey; the corporation buys the whiskey 
and holds it. But after the whiskey has appreciated in value and could 
be sold at a great profit by the corporation, the entity is liquidated. 
The dealer-shareholder pays a capital gains tax on the difference be- 
tween the fair market value of the whiskey and his basis in the 
corporate stock, which reflects the whiskey's cost. The assets get a 
stepped-up basis, so that when the dealer himself then sells the whiskey 
to a retailer at fair market value, his receipt of the proceeds will 
produce little additional taxable income. In effect, the dealer will 
have converted future ordinary income into capital gains. 
In the pure cases of the simple bailout and the nonrecognition bail- 
175. See, e.g., City Bank of Washington, 38 T.C. 713 (1962). 
176. See SURREY & WARREN, supra note 3, at 489-94. 
177. I.R.C. ?? 311, 336, 337. See pp. 130-31 and notes 167, 168 & 173 supra. 
178. Previous examples of bailout schemes covertly invoked this fundamentally dif- 
ferent General Utilities strategy. See, e.g., the liquidation-reincorporation scheme discussed 
at pp. 125-27 supra. The footnotes, however, were overt. See notes 153 & 156 supra. 
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out,179 shareholders simply attempt to convert past income, that is, 
accumulated corporate earnings already taxed as ordinary income to 
the corporation, into capital gains. They are thus seeking to avoid 
paying the double ordinary income tax created by the separate tax and 
distribution principles and implemented by the dividend principle. 
The liquor dealer, by contrast, is trying to avoid the ordinary income 
tax at both the corporate and the individual levels. He seeks to use the 
corporate form, not just in a way that will avoid the double tax pattern 
(the "corporate overtax" model) and lower his taxes to those of a 
partner or sole proprietor (the "proprietorship" model), nor even to 
get the traditional undertax advantage of the retained earnings 
strategy (the "corporate undertax" model), but in a way that will 
produce a sharply lower tax burden than any one of these three tradi- 
tional models of taxation.'80 
179. See pp. 113, 118 supra. 
180. See note 43 supra (describing "corporate overtax" model); note 45 supra (describ- 
ing "proprietorship" model); note 81 supra (describing "corporate undertax" model). 
Assume that S is a whiskey dealer and is in a marginal tax bracket of 70% for ordinary 
income and 25% for capital gains. He can buy a case of the special whiskey for $50 and 
correctly predicts that, if he then waits a year, he will be able to sell it to P for $150 
(net of expenses other than the original cost). Compare the following tax patterns: 
I. Proprietorship Model 
Acting as proprietor and dealer, S buys the whiskey, waits a year, sells it to P, and 
therefore has $100 of ordinary income, since the whiskey was inventory in his hands. 
Tax: $70. 
II. Corporate Undertax Model 
S incorporates, transferring assets and money to newly formed X Corporation. X 
buys the whiskey, waits a year, sells it to P, has income of $100, pays a tax of $48, 
and retains $52. S later bails out his retained earnings by selling X stock; $52 of 
his capital gain is attributable to retained earnings from the whiskey sale. 
Tax: $48 to X (.48 X $100) 
13 to S (.25 X $ 52) 
$61 total 
III. Collapsible Patterns (successful; pre-I.R.C. ? 341) 
(a) Liquidation-Asset Sale Sequence. S incorporates. X buys the whiskey at $50, 
waits a year, and then, when the whiskey is worth $150, liquidates. Under 
I.R.C. ?? 331 and 336, the only tax is to S on his capital gain of $100. Under id. 
? 334(a), S's basis in the whiskey is $150. He sells it to P for $150, thus realizing 
no further gain. 
Tax: $25 to S. 
(b) Stock Sale-Liquidation Sequence. S incorporates. X buys the whiskey at $50. S 
waits a year, then sells the stock to P for $150, realizing $100 of taxable capital 
gain. P liquidates X to get the whiskey, but, since his stock basis, $150, equals 
the value of the assets received, realizes no gain. 
Tax: $25 to S. 
IV. Collapsible Treatment: I.R.C. ? 341(a). 
(a) Liquidation-Asset Sale Sequence; facts as in III(a). Section 341(a) turns S's $100 
gain on liquidation into ordinary income. 
Tax: $70 to S (like example I, the Proprietorship Model) 
(b) Stock Sale-Liquidation Sequence; facts as in II(b). Section 341(a) turns S's $100 
gain on the stock sale into ordinary income. 
Tax: $70 to S (like example I, the Proprietorship Model) 
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The collapsible technique met with early successes in the courts,'81 
while Congress predictably reacted to the device with detailed statu- 
tory rules.182 The basic plan of the response seems straightforward 
enough. The main provision, section 341(a), simply reverses the usual 
manifestation of the veil decision, that stock is to be considered a 
capital asset regardless of corporate-level events: for shareholders of 
collapsible corporations, stock sales and distributions in liquidation 
V. Collapsible Treatment: I.R.C. ? 341(f); compare id. ? 337(cXlXA). 
(a) Stock Sale-Liquidation Sequence; facts as in example II1(b). Section 341(f) pro- 
vides that S's $100 gain on the stock sale will be capital gain if X consents to 
take the difference ($100) between the value and the basis of the whiskey into 
income upon its disposition in liquidation (or sale). When X liquidates, there- 
fore, it will be taxed $48. If P was ignorant of the consent and paid $150 for 
the stock, the total tax burden would be $73 ($25 to S on the stock sale plus 
$48 to X upon liquidation). But if, as is customary, P asked for representations 
and discovered the consent, he would have paid S only $102 for the stock (its 
value net of the foreseeable corporate tax). This means that S's capital gain 
would have been only $52 ($102-50), rather than $100. 
Tax: $13 to S 
48 to X 
$61 total (like example II, the Corporate Undertax Model) 
(b) Asset Sale-Liquidation-Distribution Sequence. S incorporates. X buys the whiskey 
at $50, waits a year, adopts a plan of complete liquidation, then sells the 
whiskey to P for $150 and liquidates, distributing the proceeds to S. S hopes 
that I.R.C. ? 337 will prevent gain to X on the whiskey sale, and that his gain 
on liquidation is capital gain (total tax: $25). But, under the Service's inter- 
pretation of the confusing relationship between id. ? 341(b) and id. ? 337(c) 
(1)(A), X will have $100 of taxable income on the whiskey sale, though S gets 
capital gains treatment on his $52 ($102, the liquidating distribution of X's 
after-tax proceeds, minus $50, his stock basis). Rev. Rul. 58-241, 1958-1 C.B. 179. 
Tax: $48 to X 
13 toS 
$61 total (like example II, the Corporate Undertax Model) 
Since pattern V(a) is better for the taxpayers than either pattern in example IV, 
Bittker and Eustice were wrong to suggest that ? 341(f) is useless when the prospective 
buyer knows of the consent. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 12-33. The ad- 
vantage of ? 341(f) holds even when one assumes a perhaps more realistic 35% marginal 
capital gains tax rate for the taxpayer in the 70% bracket. A lower-bracket taxpayer, 
however, might prefer ? 341(a). If his marginal rates were 60% for ordinary income and 
30% for capital gains, for example, the tax result for each pattern in the hypothetical 
case would be as follows: I, $60; II, $63.60; III, $30; IV, $60; V, $63.60. Moreover, the 
force of certain practical considerations ignored in the hypothetical case will vary with 
the facts. Subsection (f) might be favored when the corporate-level tax can be deferred 
for a significant period, but disfavored when collapsible status is uncertain and the tax- 
payer wants to gamble on not receiving either kind of collapsible treatment. Whether 
? 341(f) is better for the taxpayer than ? 341(a) thus depends upon a number of factors. 
181. Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 
(1955). 
182. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, ? 212(a), 64 Stat. 934 (amending Internal Rev. Code 
of 1939 to add ? 117(m)) (current, greatly expanded version at I.R.C. ? 341). At the time 
Congress approved this legislation, the collapsible device had not yet been tested in the 
courts. An amendment dealing specifically with the collapsible problem was considered 
desirable in order to ensure that the scheme would not result in tax advantage in the 
future. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 451. 
See also id. at 422-23, 449-51. 
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produce ordinary income.'83 Essentially, this forces the collapsible 
corporation's tax treatment into the proprietorship model of taxa- 
tion,184 as if the shareholder had never employed the corporate form. 
An alternative treatment is available under section 341(f), which in 
effect allows the taxpayer to operate within the corporate undertax 
model.185 But this conceptual simplicity of the congressional response 
contrasts starkly with the intricacy of its operational specifications. 
Section 341 is the most complex provision of subchapter C, and one of 
the most complex in the Code. One subsection'86 displays nightmarish 
levels of convolution. Moreover, an inquiry into the reasons for the 
various tests and exceptions suggests that they are not arbitrary, and 
that even an ideal draftsman could not be expected to write the sec- 
tion in a tolerably simple way without ignoring schemes for avoiding 
the basic rules or sacrificing demands for fairness and predictability.187 
Yet despite its complexity, the legislation has neither foreclosed litiga- 
tion nor prevented taxpayers from reaping substantial benefits from 
the collapsible device.188 Cultural evolution continues. 
III. The Power of Method in the Analysis of Reforms 
The ramifications of the seven basic decisions explored above define 
the legal landscape of the corporate tax culture. Yet if anything is 
183. I.R.C. ? 341(a). 
184. Compare Pattern IV with Pattern I in note 180 supra. 
185. Compare Pattern V with Pattern I in note 180 supra. 
186. Id. ? 341(e). 
187. See generally BITTKER & EuSTICE, supra note 3, chap. 12. For additional discus- 
sions of the intricacies of ? 341, see Axelrad, Collapsible Corporations and Collapsible 
Partnerships, 1960 S. CAL. TAX INST. 269; DeWind & Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 
56 COLUM. L. REV. 475 (1956); Goldstein, Section 341(d) and (e)-A Journey into Never- 
Never Land, 10 VILL. L. REV. 215 (1965); Hall, The Consenting Collapsible Corporation- 
Section 341(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1365 (1965); 
Pelletier, Shareholder Intent and Congressional Purpose in the Collapsible Corporation 
Morass, 20 TAX L. REV. 699 (1965). 
188. In Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961), the corporation in ques- 
tion had realized one-third of the total net income expected to be derived from its 
property before it was "collapsed" (the stock sold and the corporation liquidated). The 
taxpayers claimed that the corporation was not a collapsible corporation within the 
meaning of the definition in the predecessor to I.R.C. ? 341, which speaks of a corporation 
"'formed or availed of * * * with a view to the sale or exchange of the stock by its 
shareholders * * * prior to the realization by the corporation . . . of a substantial part 
of the net income to be derived from [its] property ....'" 293 F.2d at 906 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Internal Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, ? 117(m), as added 
by Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, ? 212(a), 64 Stat. 934). The taxpayers won by convincing 
the court that "a substantial part" refers to the realized, not the unrealized, portion of 
the income, and that one-third was substantial. Under this case, the shareholder in note 
180 supra could still get the tax treatment described in example III for two-thirds of the 
expected earnings. See generally Annot., [1977] 3 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) t[ 2486.13- 
.70, 2488.10, 2490.17-.30 (1976). 
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clear, it is that the consequences of these decisions rarely were fore- 
seen. Though this was no doubt due in part to the impossibility of 
predicting in full detail the effects of a particular principle, it seems 
just as evident that no one even made the effort. 
Current discussions of tax code revisions display the same error of 
omission. Reform-minded economists have studied primarily the direct 
macroeconomic impacts of the present law and proposed changes, with 
little attention to probable doctrinal ramifications within the legal 
system.'89 This inattention to the legal culture per se is unjustified. A 
system that creates intractable structural tensions and fertile fields for 
doctrinal development will lead to a substantial amount of expensive 
"legal noise" in the form of litigation, rulemaking, detailed technical 
changes in statutes, incessant updating of legal knowledge and advice, 
and the like. In the economist's own language, each possible reform 
will produce a corporate tax culture with its own particular bundle of 
legal transaction costs, and some tax systems may have less costly 
bundles than others. In the end, achieving the primary economic goals 
of reform may prove more important than or even inconsistent with 
lessening the expense, complexity, and ambiguity of the present law. 
But one should not assume this at the outset, especially given the 
controversies in the economic literature over the distributive and 
allocative consequences of the corporate tax.'90 Careful analysis of the 
impact of proposed changes on the corporate tax culture may make it 
189. See, e.g., note 33 supra (citing sources). 
190. For example, the precise manner in which the corporate tax affects the alloca- 
tion of resources would seem to depend upon who actually bears the burden it imposes. 
Yet the incidence question is unresolved. A seminal study by Marian Krzyzaniak and 
Richard Musgrave indicated that corporations shifted the tax burden to consumers by 
adjusting prices and that the tax did not induce long-term reallocation of capital from 
the corporate to the noncorporate sector. M. KRZYZANIAK & R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 33. 
The study came under extensive attack. See, e.g., Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski, supra 
note 33 (arguing that Krzyzaniak-Musgrave study failed to include variable for general 
state of economy, which could be real factor explaining their results); Goode, supra note 
33; Slitor, supra note 33. Some analysts have argued forcefully that the shifting issue is 
irrelevant to the desirability of integrating the corporate with the individual income 
tax. See, e.g., Mieszkowski, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes: The 
Bogus Issue of Shifting, 31 FINANZARCHIV 286 (1972). 
In any event, the conventional wisdom among economists seems to be that the corporate 
income tax is not economically neutral but in some way interferes with the allocation 
of resources and thereby results in an avoidable loss of welfare. See generally Harberger, 
Taxation, Resource Allocation and Welfare, in THE ROLE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES 
IN THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM 25-70 (NBER 1964). But see Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate 
Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1973) (arguing that corporate 
tax is not differential tax on capital in corporate sector, and maintaining that Harberger 
and others have confused average with marginal cost of capital in their studies). The 
remainder of this article will assume that the corporate tax burden does fall to some 
extent upon capital invested in corporations. 
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possible to further both goals, or at least to find the best trade-off 
between direct economic costs and the costs of the legal culture. 
Part III attempts to fill the gap left by abstract economic analysis by 
forecasting the effects that various revisions would induce in the 
present corporate tax culture. First, it will posit a radical change in 
each of the seven basic principles in turn and assess the legal con- 
sequences of the change on the assumption that all other principles 
remain intact. Some of the imagined changes will seem familiar; 
others will seem odd, at least when examined in isolation. All have 
intriguing doctrinal consequences. The analysis of each change will 
predict in serial fashion the effects upon the major cultural activities 
and products explored in Part II: taxpayers' choice of business form; 
pressures for relief legislation such as subchapter S; patterns of alloca- 
tion of resources and distribution of the tax burden; use of the re- 
tained earnings strategy; disguises of dividends; simple bailouts and 
tensions in the treatment of liquidations, redemptions, and other 
hybrid transactions; attempts to consummate nonrecognition bailouts; 
and exploitations of the General Utilities principle. Next, Part III will 
present and analyze in the same fashion one combination of changes 
that offers great promise as a reform package. A complete use of the 
method of analysis employed in Part III would entail an examination 
of every logically possible combination of changes in the seven basic 
principles, but it is neither necessary nor feasible to depict those 
dozens of alternative tax systems here. The focus throughout will be 
on tracing the ramifications of each change in the legal culture itself. 
For the sake of completeness, some rather conventional observations 
about probable macroeconomic consequences are included.'91 But the 
real concern is to isolate and assess cultural repercussions. 
A. Systematic Analysis of Fundamental Changes 
1. Abolition of the Separate Corporate Tax 
Suppose first that the taxing of income to corporations were abol- 
ished and no other basic changes were made. There would be no 
191. In addition, the analysis assumes, except where otherwise stated, the present 
basic relationships among tax rates; that is, a virtually flat corporate rate and a pro- 
gressive spectrum of individual rates, some higher, others lower than the corporate rate. 
The analysis also assumes that progressivity is a real, not just a rhetorical, norm of our 
income tax system. Without this assumption, it could be argued that various techniques 
in the existing and hypothesized systems for reducing effective tax rates on high-bracket 
shareholders' corporate-source income below their nominal individual rates are justified 
as expressions of society's "deep-level" acceptance of the view that strict progressivity is 
really neither feasible nor desirable. 
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"double tax." Shareholders would pay an ordinary income tax on 
corporate earnings distributed as dividends; the tax treatment of such 
earnings would be like that for partners or sole proprietors.'92 The 
benefits of retaining corporate earnings would be greatly magnified,193 
for corporate income retained and later realized by shareholders in a 
stock sale would be taxed only once, at capital gains rates. The 
corporate form would thus become a more desirable investment 
vehicle than the partnership or proprietorship. Partners are taxed on 
partnership income whether or not it is distributed, and for propri- 
etors, who do business without the benefit of a separate legal entity, 
the question of retention or distribution is moot.'94 
The new principle would mean much less planning, litigation, and 
rulemaking focused on the choice of business form. All businesses 
would choose the corporate form unless compelling nontax considera- 
tions dictated otherwise. There would be no need for subchapter S or 
for other legislation designed to ameliorate the harshness of the double 
tax. There would be no double tax, and in any event a subchapter S 
corporation would be an inferior choice for the same reason as would 
a partnership: the taxpayers would forgo the benefits of the retained 
earnings strategy. This might cause a distorted allocation of resources 
to the corporate sector, and a distortion of managements' internal 
financing decisions in the direction of retention of corporate earnings. 
The increased impetus to the retained earnings strategy would in- 
tensify the efforts of taxpayers to evade the accumulated earnings tax 
and personal holding company tax provisions and would heighten 
incentives for the Service to make them efficacious. There might be a 
resulting increase in the complexity of the provisions. The importance 
of disguised dividend techniques, however, would diminish. Share- 
192. For example, an additional $100 of corporate income would produce a total 
federal income tax burden of $70 when distributed as a dividend to a shareholder with 
a 707%O marginal tax rate, just as an additional $100 of business income would produce a 
$70 tax burden to a sole proprietor with the same marginal rate. Under the present 
system, a current distribution would produce a combined tax burden of $84.40 to the 
corporation and shareholder, even though a sole proprietor would pay only $70. See note 
43 supra. 
193. If the corporation in the preceding footnote employed the retained earnings 
strategy, the total tax burden under the hypothetical new regime would be $25-$O tax 
to the corporation and $25 to the shareholder when he sold his stock ($100, his share of 
the retained earnings, times 25%, his assumed marginal rate for capital gains). The 
shareholder would thus save $45-$70 minus $25-over a policy of currently distributing 
corporate income. See note 43 supra. In addition, he would benefit from deferring the 
shareholder-level tax. Under the present system, the retained earnings strategy would 
produce a total tax burden of $61. See note 81 supra. This represents a saving of only 
$23.40-$84.40 minus $61-over a current distribution policy. 
194. See note 24 supra. 
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holders and close corporations would have little reason to disguise 
dividends as salaries, interest payments, and the like, for all would 
result in the same tax burden: one tax, to the shareholder, at his 
ordinary income rate.'95 
The consequences of the capital gains, dividend, corporate veil, and 
nonrecognition principles would be similar to those under the present 
system. Since capital gains would still be taxed preferentially, the 
same irresolvable tensions in the redemption and partial liquidation 
areas would persist; permutations of the simple bailouts and the non- 
recognition bailouts would continue. Indeed, the greater reward to 
successful bailouts under the new first principle'96 might speed 
developments in these areas. There would still be a need to devote 
enormous efforts to making the nonrecognition provisions operational 
and adapting them to new business practices. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, eliminating the separate 
corporate tax would not only fail to ameliorate the unpleasant con- 
sequences of the General Utilities principle, but it would also extend 
them significantly. The shocking tax result of the successful collapsible 
corporation-the elimination of an ordinary income tax at either the 
corporate or the shareholder level, and the payment of a mere capital 
gains tax at the shareholder level-would become a generalized benefit 
of all bailouts under the new principle. A simple sale of stock for the 
purpose of cashing in one's share of retained earnings, for example, 
would produce the same tax result as does the successful collapsible 
corporation now.'97 But at present, the collapsible device works only 
when the value at the corporate level inheres in appreciated corporate 
property-when it represents future income, not current or retained 
earnings. The simple and nonrecognition bailouts under the present 
system do enable a reduction of taxes on retained earnings, but only 
to the level of the corporate undertax model.'98 Under the new regime, 
these bailouts would reduce the tax burden to a level that only the 
classic collapsible corporation can achieve in the present system. More- 
over, the General Utilities principle itself, that distributions in kind 
195. Of course, fraudulent disguises would likely persist. The corporation might term 
a distribution a loan, when the loan in fact will never be repaid, or the shareholder 
might use or consume company assets for personal purposes without reporting as income 
the value thus received. In either case, the aim would be to avoid paying any income tax 
at all. 
196. Successful bailouts would produce greater rewards because of the magnified ad- 
vantage of obtaining capital gains treatment upon the disposition of stock. See note 193 
supra. 
197. Compare note 193 supra with example III in note 180 supra. 
198. See pp. 111-14, 118-30 and notes 81, 100 & 156 supra. 
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create no gain or loss to the corporation, would become surplusage in 
the new system; its rule would be simply a particular application of 
the new first principle, which implies that a corporation never has 
taxable income. A Congress horrified by the resulting tax-reduction 
possibilities for shareholders might well supplement the accumulated 
earnings tax provisions by enacting new antibailout provisions as 
complicated as present section 341. These provisions would throw the 
corporation and its shareholders into the proprietorship model of 
taxation under intricately specified conditions, in order to forestall 
the intentional formation or use of the corporate form for the sole or 
principal purpose of reducing taxes. 
Simply abolishing the corporate tax, then, would have unfavorable 
overall effects. Although it would decrease activity centered on choice 
of business form or special relief legislation and would virtually 
eliminate disguised dividend techniques, it would neither affect the 
problematic liquidation and redemption areas nor discourage simple 
and nonrecognition bailout attempts. It would encourage over-reten- 
tion of earnings and might distort the allocation of resources. Worst of 
all, it would generalize the tax results of the General Utilities bailout 
and thus, perhaps, create further incentives to devise simple and non- 
recognition bailouts. Both economic analysis and doctrinal prognosis 
would condemn this simple change. 
2. Abolition of the Shareholder-Level Tax on Distributions 
The distribution principle has several aspects, and there is no one 
"opposite" version of it. But suppose that corporate distributions, even 
though out of current or accumulated corporate earnings, were never 
taxed to shareholders. This, in more traditional language, would create 
an unlimited "dividends-received exclusion": no dividends would be in- 
cluded in shareholders' incomes. Such an exclusion has occasionally 
been considered as a means of eliminating the double tax on corporate 
income, though careful economic analysts have criticized it as a poor 
way to achieve this goal.'99 
As a formal matter, the change would make the dividend principle 
meaningless. There is no point in presuming distributions to be out 
of earnings and profits and in stating which rates apply to them if they 
are not to be taxed at all. But the most striking result for the legal 
culture would be the inversion of taxpayer incentives in a number of 
areas: since dividends would incur no tax, the many schemes for ex- 
199. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 32, at 552-53. 
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tracting retained corporate earnings at capital gains rates would be- 
come undesirable. 
Under the new second principle, choice of business form would be 
even more important than it is today. At present, the chance to fare 
better as a shareholder than as a partner or sole proprietor obtains only 
for higher-bracket taxpayers, who can bail out retained earnings at 
capital gains rates that, combined with the corporate-level tax, produce 
a lower total tax burden than would individual marginal tax rates.200 
But if distributions were not taxed, all investors with marginal tax 
rates greater than the flat corporate rate would prefer to be share- 
holders in corporations. All investors with marginal tax rates lower 
than the corporate rate would prefer to be partners or proprietors un- 
less nontax considerations dictated otherwise; they would continue to 
utilize subchapter S and press for other relief legislation. Because of 
the sharp relief to higher-bracket taxpayers, the new principle would 
foster greater deviations from the progressive rate structure of the 
individual income tax than does the present system. And because of 
the magnitude of the holdings of higher-bracket taxpayers, there might 
follow an excessive allocation of resources to the corporate sector. 
At first glance, the new principle might seem to free corporations of 
any tax incentives to bias their internal financing decisions, since 
shareholders would not be taxed regardless of whether earnings were 
retained instead of distributed. Retention of earnings for tax purposes 
indeed should vanish; this would relieve current stress on the accu- 
mulated earnings tax and personal holding company tax provisions. 
But as noted below in connection with the capital gains and corporate 
200. See note 81 supra (explaining why, under present system, not all investors whose 
marginal tax rates exceed 48%o would prefer corporate to proprietorship form). To take 
a specific example, consider a taxpayer with marginal rates of 60% for ordinary income 
and 25%1 for capital gains. If he employs the corporate undertax model in the present 
system, his total tax burden for an additional $100 of business income is $61-a tax of 
$48 to the corporation and $13, or 25% of the retained earnings, to the shareholder upon 
sale of the appropriate amount of stock. This is $1 more than he would pay as a 
proprietor. If one restricts attention to investors whose marginal rate for capital gains 
is 25% and ignores the benefits of deferring the shareholder-level tax, only investors 
with marginal tax rates exceeding 61% for ordinary income will prefer the corporate to 
the proprietorship form for tax reasons alone. When the value of deferral (which will 
vary with the length of deferral and the discount rate) is taken into account, share- 
holders with marginal rates of less than 61% may find the corporate form desirable. But 
the perceived benefits of deferral would have to be extraordinary to excite the interest of 
those in the lower reaches of the 48%-61% range. Furthermore, as the investor's marginal 
rate for capital gains rises above 25%, the advantage of the undertax model diminishes 
and eventually is vitiated. 
By contrast, any investor whose marginal rate exceeded 48% would prefer the tax 
results of the corporate form to those of a proprietorship were the individual tax on 
distributions abolished. 
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veil decisions, the essence of the problem would persist in inverse form. 
Disguised dividend techniques would become a more serious prob- 
lem under the new principle. Higher-bracket shareholders would at- 
tempt to turn the law on its head: they would not wish to disguise 
dividends as salaries, interest payments, or the like; instead, they 
would have an incentive to disguise the latter as dividends, since 
dividend income would be taxed only once at the flat corporate rate, 
which, to them, would be relatively low. Yet for lower-bracket tax- 
payers, the incentives would remain as they are now. The Service 
could be expected to pipe different tunes in the two sorts of cases; this 
would likely make the law even more complex than it is now. In any 
event, this consequence is not a neutral one, for even if the ultimate 
shape of the law were not much more objectionable than the present 
one, there would still be a costly but quite fruitless period of transi- 
tion, as litigants and judges tried to formulate rules to govern both 
kinds of disguises. 
Since the capital gains and corporate veil decisions would still exist, 
it would continue to make a difference whether a shareholder cashed 
in his pro rata share of the corporation's accumulated earnings by a 
corporate distribution or by a stock disposition. A sale of stock would 
normally result in a capital gains tax on all proceeds attributable to 
the corporation's accumulated earnings. But a simple dividend distri- 
bution of the same earnings would result in no tax. Consequently, the 
shareholder whose corporation had accumulated earnings and who 
wanted to sell to an outsider would pressure the corporation to pay 
dividends before he sold. This is precisely the opposite of what he 
would do now, for the current law favors dispositions over distribu- 
tions. Given enough would-be sellers, there would be pressure for 
corporations to bias their internal financing decisions toward payment 
of dividends. Furthermore, the shareholder who wanted to sell his 
stock to the corporation, whether in a liquidation, partial liquidation, 
or redemption, would be anxious to fail to meet the requirements for 
disposition-type treatment and its resulting capital gains tax, while the 
Service would be pressing in the opposite direction. This complete 
reversal of present incentives would perpetuate the irresolvable ten- 
sions and confusions in a world of mirror images. Conceivably, the 
same statutory language relating to redemptions and liquidations could 
be retained. More likely, the Service would press successfully for 
changes, for the present law makes it too easy for taxpayers to fail 
deliberately to meet the test for disposition-type treatment.201 The 
201. For example, under present I.R.C. ? 302(b)(2), a redemption, if it is to produce 
exchange-type treatment, must result in the shareholder's owning less than 80% of his 
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new principle would thus spawn a costly process of doctrinal evolu- 
tion, without any hope that it would result in a more satisfactory legal 
pattern.202 
The nonrecognition provisions would be somewhat less necessary. 
Since all dividends would be nontaxable under the new principle, 
special rules for not taxing certain stock dividends and spin-offs would 
be superfluous. There might, however, arise a need to isolate some 
stock dividend arrangements as disguised redemptions or "essentially 
equivalent to redemptions" and as therefore meriting disposition-type 
tax treatment. And the nonrecognition provisions would still be 
needed to prevent taxation of exchanges of stock in split-offs,203 split- 
ups,204 recapitalizations, mergers, and incorporations. But the present 
nonrecognition bailouts would no longer serve any purpose, for they 
are designed to extract corporate earnings without incurring ordinary 
tax liability for dividends. 
The consequences of the General Utilities principle would persist. 
The successful collapsible corporation would still be a desirable tax 
objective, since a solitary capital gains tax on business income would 
be significantly lower, for all shareholders, than the flat corporate-rate 
tax on the same income. In the new system, however, the importance 
of the difference between sections 341(a) and 341(f), essentially the 
difference between the proprietorship model and a normal corporate 
model of taxation, would be greater than it is now.205 This might lead 
preredemption share of the equity interest and voting power in the corporation. It 
would be easy enough for shareholders to keep their redemptions from triggering this 
test or to spread them over time so that they appeared to be separate transactions. The 
Service would want to lower the percentage figure in the statute, abolish the attribution 
rules and ? 304, and institute elaborate provisions for integration of transactions under 
various conditions. 
202. Realistically, those who favor a dividends-received exclusion are likely to call 
as well for stock basis adjustments following payment of the corporate tax. For example, 
the stock basis might be adjusted upward by the amount of a share's pro rata claim on 
the after-tax addition to retained earnings; this would mean that there would be no 
taxable gain attributable to those retained earnings if the share were later sold. But this 
attempt to harmonize the treatment of dispositions with that of distributions modifies 
the third aspect of the corporate veil principle-a change ruled out for the present 
analysis. But cf. pp. 153-62 infra (discussing related change as part of reform package). 
203. A "split-off" is like a spin-off, except that the distributee-shareholders not only 
receive the spun- or split-off company's shares but also surrender some of their old shares 
in exchange therefor. 
204. In a "split-up," the two or more businesses of the old corporation are all trans- 
ferred to subsidiary corporations, and the old corporation, now a mere holding company, 
is completely liquidated. 
205. The tax treatment of collapsible corporations under I.R.C. ? 341(a) produces a 
total tax burden of $70 on income of $100. If ? 341(f) is applied instead, the tax burden 
is $61. See note 180 supra. The difference, obviously, is $9. In the new system, throwing 
a collapsible corporation into the proprietorship model would produce a tax burden of 
$70, but allowing it the lowest legitimate tax treatment for corporations would produce 
a burden of $48. The difference now is $22. 
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to further changes in the complex provisions governing collapsible 
corporations. 
An unlimited dividends-received exclusion would thus have some 
good consequences. It would abolish the retained earnings strategy 
(plus the accumulated earnings tax and personal holding company tax 
provisions and their lore) and would eliminate the incentive for most 
of the nonrecognition bailouts. It would make no improvement with 
respect to subchapter S developments and the progeny of the General 
Utilities principle; indeed, it might further complicate the tax treat- 
ment of the latter. And it would have several bad consequences: ac- 
centuation of the importance of choice of business form; untoward 
allocative and distributive effects; and the starting of new, futile, but 
costly lines of doctrinal development by reversing the position of the 
taxpayers and Service in the disguised dividend, liquidation, partial 
liquidation, redemption, and bootstrap acquisition areas. Again, ab- 
stract economic analysis and prediction of doctrinal developments point 
toward the same result. Adopting the exclusion would hardly seem 
wise. Even worse would be a system creating a partial or "limited" 
dividends-received exclusion, for it would contain the undesirable fea- 
tures noted above as well as those of the present system. 
3. Abolition of the Capital Gains Preference 
Suppose capital gains were taxed at the same rates as ordinary in- 
come, and capital losses were treated as ordinary losses. The most 
obvious impact is that shareholders could not avoid double taxation 
of corporate income at ordinary income rates by selling stock to get 
the value of their share of retained earnings. All corporate earnings 
would be taxed on the corporate overtax model.206 The only point of 
the retained earnings strategy would be to defer part of the tax 
burden.207 The double tax would thus bite more deeply; attempts to 
evade it would be redoubled; and yet, by definition, there could be no 
bailouts. 
Problems connected with the choice of business form would in- 
tensify. Many businesses are strongly pressured to seek the nontax ad- 
vantages of the corporate form, but under the new system, that form 
206. See note 43 supra. 
207. That deferral would be the only remaining tax benefit might mean that the 
desire for deferral would become much greater and that shareholders would press more 
persistently for retention of earnings. If so, the problem of "locked-in" corporate earn- 
ings would be aggravated. See pp. 104-05 supra. This observation applies whenever a 
reform package would reduce the benefits of the retained earnings strategy to "mere" 
deferral. 
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would have farther-reaching and more certain tax disadvantages than at 
present. For the same reason, there would be greater pressure for 
relief legislation of the subchapter S type, and more daring attempts 
to fit nonqualifying corporations under such provisions. Any distorted 
allocation of resources away from the corporate sector would be ag- 
gravated, as would the horizontal and vertical inequities of the present 
system.208 
The retained earnings strategy and attendant accumulated earnings 
tax and personal holding company tax provisions would diminish in 
importance, for unnecessary retention of earnings would do no more 
than defer the shareholder-level tax. Conversely, disguised dividend 
techniques would become more important than ever, and legal devel- 
opments in the area would accelerate. 
The most obvious positive consequence of abolishing the capital 
gains preference is that it would take the wind out of bailout devices. 
Since converting ordinary income into the same amount of capital gain 
would not lower one's tax rate, simple bailout techniques would have 
much less point. But tax incentives for preferring stock dispositions 
over distributions would remain, because the different computational 
procedures would result in different amounts of taxable income under 
each model. Under the corporate veil decision, proceeds of stock sales 
and dispositions treated as stock sales are first allocated to nontaxable 
recovery of the stock's basis. Under the distribution principle, dis- 
tributed amounts are first treated as coming out of corporate earnings 
and profits and to that extent are fully taxable. Frequently, situations 
would arise in which the shareholder would prefer selling part of his 
stock to receiving a dividend.209 If the corporate veil decision were not 
208. "Vertical inequity" refers to the practice of taxing corporate-source income dif- 
ferently than other income at the shareholder level. "Horizontal inequity" refers to the 
dissimilar tax treatment of two taxpayers with equal amounts but different sources of 
pretax income. That efficient markets discount for taxes, so that investments of equal 
risk tend to produce equal after-tax rates of return, mitigates horizontal inequity in the 
long run, but only for investors who purchase after the discounting process has occurred. 
209. Consider X Corporation with the following tax balance sheet: 
Assets 
Cash $150 
Other assets 150 
Liabilities 
Legal capital $200 
Earnings and profits 100 
The sole shareholder (S) has a total stock basis of $200. The corporation's business could 
relinquish $60 of the cash and still operate efficiently. S wants $60. If he caused X to 
pay a $60 dividend, he would pay an ordinary income tax on the entire amount, as 
required by the distribution principle. See I.R.C. ?? 316(a); 301(a), (b)(l)(A), (c). If he 
sold 20% of his stock for $60, his taxable gain would be only $20-the $60 of proceeds 
minus the $40 basis in the stock sold (20% of the total stock basis of $200). Under the 
new system, the $20 gain would be taxed at ordinary rates, but the shareholder would 
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changed along with the capital gains decision, the Service would at- 
tempt to curtail the benefits of "recovery of basis first" by making it 
difficult for redemptions and liquidations to qualify for sale-type 
treatment and by treating them solely as distributions if they did not 
qualify. Thus, tensions in the redemption and liquidation areas would 
persist, though perhaps not in their currently aggravated form. 
The nonrecognition bailouts would become entirely fruitless upon 
elimination of the capital gains preference. Similarly, the collapsible 
corporation device would be pointless and section 341 unnecessary. 
The value of the appreciation in assets held by the collapsible corpo- 
ration would be taxed at ordinary income rates upon liquidation or 
sale of the stock, and the scheming shareholders, even if not attacked 
under section 341, would have succeeded only in avoiding the double 
taxation of corporate-source income-a result they could achieve by not 
bothering to incorporate at all.210 Hence, taxpayers would not form 
certainly prefer a computational procedure that reduces the amount of taxable income 
from $60 to $20. 
This advantage would disappear if S extracted the total value of his investment in the 
corporation. If he sold all his stock, the gain would be $100 ($300, the value of the under- 
lying assets, minus the total stock basis of $200) which would be taxable in the new 
system at ordinary rates. If the corporation liquidated and the event were given sale-type 
treatment, the result would be the same. But even if the corporation liquidated and the 
event were treated as a pure distribution, the shareholder would still have taxable 
ordinary income of $100, since there was only $100 of earnings and profits out of which 
distributed amounts could be deemed to come. 
Moreover, the preference for stock dispositions would be reversed for individual share- 






Fair Market Value 350 
Liabilities 
Legal Capital $300 
Earnings and profits 0 
S has a total stock basis of $300 and wishes to obtain $100 in cash. If he sold 20% of his 
stock for $100 (20% of the company's total market value of $500), he could offset $60 
(20% of his total stock basis of $300) and report $40 of taxable gain. By contrast, a simple 
distribution of $100 of cash from X to S would produce no taxable income, for there 
are no earnings and profits; the entire $100 would simply reduce S's stock basis. S's 
preference for a distribution in this example results from the general income tax law's 
realization requirement: the mere appreciation in value of X's "other assets" does not 
produce 'income" that is taxed to X and reflected in its earnings and profits account. 
210. If the whiskey dealer in note 180 supra had successfully "collapsed," as in example 
III of the hypothetical, his gain of $100 would have been taxed under the new system 
at his ordinary marginal rate, producing a total tax burden of $70. This is $14.40 less 
than the $84.40 that the corporate overtax model would exact-a result not changed in 
the new regime. But it is no better than the burden of $70 that the whiskey dealer 
would have borne had he simply handled the purchase and sale as part of the regular 
business of his proprietorship. See note 180 siipra (example I). 
If the whiskey dealer were already doing business through a legitimate corporation, he 
could still avoid the double tax pattern by having the corporation replace cash dividends 
with distributions in kind of appreciated property, whenever this was feasible as a 
business matter. 
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corporations solely to take advantage of the General Utilities principle. 
But the principle would still be useful for existing, legitimate corpora- 
tions holding appreciated property. Distributing such property instead 
of selling it and distributing cash would still evade the double tax. 
Problems stemming from this aspect of the General Utilities principle 
would persist, along with the related statutory provisions211 and case 
law glosses. 
The overall consequences of abolishing the capital gains preference 
present a mixed picture. The change would increase the importance 
of choice of business form, generate new pressures for relief legislation, 
render the corporate form more disadvantageous and inequitable, and 
increase efforts to disguise dividends. But it would reduce stress on 
the accumulated earnings tax and personal holding company tax 
provisions and, most importantly, would greatly diminish incentives to 
use or invent various bailout devices, even though it would not com- 
pletely eliminate the tensions in the liquidation and redemption 
areas and the problems generated by the General Utilities decision. 
Simply eliminating preferential treatment for capital gains, then, is 
not a clearly desirable reform. It is important to remember, however, 
that the predictions above assume that no other changes in the basic 
principles have been made212 and that they pertain only to the 
desirability of the change for the corporate tax culture. 
4. Taxation of Dividends at Capital Gain Rates 
Suppose the dividend principle were changed by declaring that 
corporate dividends were henceforward to be taxed at capital gains 
rates. The most obvious effect would be that shareholders could get 
the benefits of the corporate undertax model without employing the 
retained earnings strategy. Their shares of the corporation's after-tax 
earnings would be taxed at capital gains rates whether realized in a 
stock sale or received as dividends. The only benefit of earnings re- 
tention would be deferral of the shareholder-level tax. Even the 
corporation that currently distributed all its earnings as dividends 
would produce, for high-bracket taxpayers, a tax burden less than 
that of a comparable partnership or sole proprietorship.213 
211. I.R.C. ?? 311. 336. 337. 
212. Cf. pp. 153-62 infra (discussing abolition of capital gains principle in con- 
tion with other basic changes). 
213. The high-bracket investor operating as sole proprietor or partner would pay a 
$70 tax on each additional $100 of earnings. If operating in corporate forni under the 
new principle, he would pay only $61, and there would no longer be two different 
corporate models ("overtax" and "undertax"). See notes 43, 45 & 81 supra. 
Investors with marginal tax rates of 58% or less would still prefer the tax treatment of 
147 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 90, 1977 
Under such a system, choice of business form would remain a live 
problem, though more high-bracket shareholders-those wanting cur- 
rent dividends, as well as those content with increases in stock values- 
would prefer the corporate form. Subchapter S too would persist and 
would continue to generate problems, since lower-bracket investors 
would still be attracted to that vehicle. More resources might be al- 
located to the corporate sector, for the change would lessen the burden 
of double taxation. This would be advantageous if it is indeed true 
that the existing system unduly diverts resources from the corporate 
sector,214 for the new effect would offset such distortions to some ex- 
tent. Internal financing decisions would remain biased toward reten- 
tion of earnings, but only to the extent that taxpayers expected net 
benefits from the deferral of taxes; the accumulated earnings tax and 
personal holding company tax provisions would become correspond- 
ingly less important and less troublesome. Equity problems would be 
similar to those of the present system.215 
The new principle would encourage high-bracket shareholders to 
disguise salaries and interest payments as dividends, for the same reason 
discussed in connection with the hypothetical elimination of the entire 
shareholder-level tax on distributions.216 Lower-bracket shareholders, 
however, would continue to disguise dividends as other things. The 
law would become more confusing and uncertain. 
The tensions generated by the present antithetical principles in- 
voked by hybrid transactions would abate, and attempts to achieve 
simple bailouts would subside. Both distributions and dispositions 
would produce capital gains taxation for the shareholder. But under 
the new principle, as in a system without the capital gains preference, 
individual shareholders still might prefer disposition-type treatment 
to distribution-type treatment, because the computational procedures 
mandated by the corporate veil decision often would produce a lower 
amount of gain.217 Thus a body of law specifying conditions for 
treating redemptions and liquidations as dispositions would remain, 
but it would be less important and perhaps less complex. 
the proprietorship or partnership form to that of the corporation. Investors with 
marginal rates between 48% and about 61% would find the new tax aspects of the 
corporate form attractive only if they wished to defer the individual tax by retaining 
earnings. Frequently, however, this deferral value would be outweighed by the difference 
between these individuals' comparatively low marginal tax rates for ordinary income and 
the sum of the corporate rate and individual capital gains rates. 
214. See note 190 supra. 
215. See note 208 supra. 
216. See pp. 141-43 & note 200 supra. 
217. See pp. 145-46 & note 209 supra. 
148 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Morphogenesis of Subchapter C 
Nonrecognition bailouts would lose all purpose. The consequences 
of the General Utilities principle, however, would persist in even more 
offensive form. Taxpayers could achieve the tax objectives of the 
collapsible corporation device without selling stock and without liq- 
uidating their corporations. Any distribution of appreciated inventory 
or similar property would avoid imposition of an ordinary income tax 
at either level and would produce only a capital gains tax at the 
shareholder level. Undoubtedly, the Service would seek statutory 
weapons against distributions in kind motivated solely or principally 
by tax considerations. The tumorous convolutions of section 341 
might metastasize to all provisions involving distributions. 
Taxing dividends at capital gains rates thus would have the adverse 
consequences of complicating the disguised dividend area and gen- 
eralizing the tax reduction opportunities of the General Utilities 
principle. But its effects on the choice of business form and the demand 
for special deals like subchapter S, as well as its overall allocative and 
distributive consequences, seem relatively unimportant. Moreover, it 
would have very good effects in curtailing the retained earnings 
strategy and thereby in relieving the need for the accumulated earn- 
ings tax and personal holding company tax provisions, damping in- 
centives to exploit simple bailout devices, reducing tensions in the 
redemption and liquidation areas, and abolishing attempts at non- 
recognition bailouts. This is a surprisingly favorable balance sheet 
for a proposal that seems never to have been taken seriously. Quite 
probably, it is the conceptual dissonance of likening dividend pay- 
ments (which are clearly fruit of the tree) to proceeds of the sale of a 
capital asset (the tree itself) that has hampered analysis of this idea. 
And some analysts may have realized that other changes218 would 
achieve the good consequences of this new principle in a more com- 
plete way. 
5. Making Stock Dispositions Dependent on 
Corporate-Level Attributes 
The corporate veil principle could be changed in various ways. One 
alternative would be to declare that stock is not a capital asset, so that 
gain from its sale produces ordinary income. The consequences of this 
move would be similar to those of abolishing the capital gains prefer- 
ence entirely. A more interesting alternative to the veil decision is to 
harmonize the tax treatment of stock dispositions with that of distribu- 
218. See pp. 153-62 infra. 
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tions by basing it on corporate earnings and profits accounts associated 
with each share. The discussion of the veil principle in Part II ex- 
plored the mechanics of this alternative world.219 In such a system, 
stock sales and simple bailout devices would not outflank the corporate 
overtax model of taxation,220 and artificial retention of earnings would 
only defer the individual tax. Obviously, the administrative costs of 
basing the tax treatment of stock dispositions upon corporate-level 
bookkeeping would be enormous. To offset these costs, benefits would 
have to be quite substantial. 
The greater incidence of double taxation at ordinary rates would 
result in an exodus from the corporate form, a move, no doubt, that 
nontax considerations would block for many large companies. The 
demand for special provisions such as subchapter S would be intensi- 
fied. A greater misallocation of resources away from the corporate 
sector would likely ensue. 
Deferring taxes through retention of earnings would remain a use- 
ful technique, and the legal weapons against such delay would persist. 
Pressures to disguise dividends would be more intense: although the 
amount of potential tax avoidance would be the same, there would be 
fewer alternatives for reducing taxes. The simple bailouts would be 
useless, for the computational procedures for dispositions and distribu- 
tions would yield identical amounts of ordinary income or capital 
gains. This would ameliorate present difficulties in classifying hybrid 
transactions for tax purposes. The nonrecognition bailouts would be 
equally pointless if appropriate technical rules were adopted. Upon 
distribution of nontaxable stock dividends, for example, amounts 
from the earnings and profits accounts attributable to the stock on 
which the dividend was declared would have to be allocated to the 
dividend shares, in order to create earnings and profits accounts for 
the latter. Otherwise, the sequence of events in the preferred stock 
219. See pp. 108-10 & notes 77-80 supra. 
220. In the new system, proceeds from sales of stock would first reduce earnings and 
profits accounts; they would be taxed as ordinary income to the extent of those earnings 
and profits. See pp. 108-10 and notes 78 & 79 supra. The high-bracket investor employing 
the retained earnings strategy and cashing in his share of retained earnings by selling 
stock would thus bear a total tax burden of $84.40 on each additional $100 of pretax 
corporate income allocable to his shares-a $48 tax to the corporation and a $36.40 in- 
dividual tax on the remainder (70% of $52). Cf. notes 43 & 81 supra (illustrating present 
corporate overtax and undertax models). If sales proceeds exceeded the sum of cor- 
responding earnings and profits plus the amount of the seller's basis in the stock sold, 
the excess would be taxed at capital gains rates. (The excess would generally be due to 
unrealized corporate-level income, i.e., appreciation in value of corporate assets.) The 
same benefit now obtains for distributions that exceed the sum of the stock's pro rata 
share of earnings and profits and the stock's basis. See I.R.C. ? 301(c). 
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bailouts could still reduce taxes.221 Similar points apply to corporate 
divisions and to receipt of debt securities in a recapitalization or 
merger. These technical adjustments would add to the administrative 
costs of the new system. 
Collapsible corporations would still be attractive devices. The real- 
ization requirement and the General Utilities principle would prevent 
addition of appreciation in asset values to earnings and profits ac- 
counts. Hence, such gains would still qualify for capital gains treat- 
ment upon "collapse" by liquidation or stock sale, unless section 341 
were applied. Other consequences of the General Utilities principle 
would persist as well, since existing, legitimate corporations would 
still have an incentive to distribute rather than sell appreciated 
property. 
The most favorable consequences of the hypothetical change in the 
corporate veil decision would be the elimination of simple and non- 
recognition bailouts, but these would have to be balanced against sub- 
stantial administrative costs and, arguably, against further misalloca- 
tion of resources. It would leave intact or mildly aggravate problems 
associated with choice of business form, subchapter S, retention of 
earnings, disguised dividends, and the General Utilities principle. The 
consequences as a whole seem not to promise distinct improvement. 
6. Abolition of Nonrecognition Provisions 
Assume the most extreme of conceivable departures from the non- 
recognition principle: no nonrecognition provisions other than those 
excepting undistributed corporate income from the shareholder-level 
tax. This radical rule would obviate the considerable efforts now ex- 
pended in applying the nonrecognition provisions and in adapting 
them to changing business practices. It would eliminate most222 of 
the nonrecognition bailouts. Hence the rule might increase incentives 
to disguise dividends, retain earnings, and employ simple and General 
Utilities bailouts, in order to clear corporations of earnings before 
221. See pp. 119-20 supra. If portions of existing earnings and profits were not 
allocated to the nontaxable dividend stock, proceeds from its sale would first reduce its 
basis, and the excess would be capital gain. By contrast, a cash dividend on preexisting 
stock would be deemed to come first out of the stock's earnings and profits accounts 
(and to that extent would be treated as ordinary income), as would proceeds from the 
sale of such stock. Consequently, stock dividends would be used to reduce taxes in the 
new system, unless the suggested technical rule, or some other weapon, were adopted. 
222. Abolishing nonrecognition provisions would render useless preferred stock bail- 
outs, see pp. 119-20 siipr-a; divisive bailouts, see pp. 121-23 sulfra; and security bailouts, 
see pp. 123-24 supra. But some liquidation-reincorporation schemes would still be worth- 
while. See pp. 125-27 and notes 156 & 157 stipra. 
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major organic changes such as mergers, which today are nontaxable. 
The remaining doctrinal landscape should change very little under 
the new rule. The effects of the nonrecognition principle are more 
isolable than those of the earlier decisions. 
Such a proposal, however, would raise an important issue of eco- 
nomic policy. Abolishing nonrecognition provisions without changing 
other principles would erect a substantial tax barrier to major changes 
in business form, such as midstream incorporations of existing busi- 
nesses, mergers, recapitalizations, and corporate separations. Such 
changes can serve legitimate and important business purposes, and 
hindering them could be economically undesirable. This large but 
separable issue need not be pursued here. 
7. Reversal of the General Utilities Principle223 
Suppose that all corporate distributions of appreciated property gave 
rise to corporate income, taxable at ordinary or capital gains rates 
depending on the nature of the property. The intricate rules now 
governing such distributions would not exist, and there would be no 
need for provisions preventing recognition of corporate gain or loss 
from sales of corporate assets following adoption of a plan of liquida- 
tion. The exemptions and judicial accretions to those provisions would 
likewise disappear. There would be no General Utilities bailouts and 
no collapsible corporations. Monstrous section 341 could be repealed. 
These consequences would be good ones; they would streamline the 
legal culture and muffle some expensive "noise" in the system. 
Remarkably, the new principle would have very little impact on 
consequences stemming from the first six basic principles. The Gen- 
eral Utilities principle, like the nonrecognition rules, has fairly isolable 
effects. One exception is that the insistence on two-level taxation of 
appreciated property would hinder cash sales of corporate businesses, 
or at least create a bias for stock sales, and would thus encourage more 
taxpayers to seek the benefits of the reorganization provisions and 
perhaps to play fast and loose with those provisions. But, in general, 
reversal of the General Utilities principle is a reform measure that is 
hard to fault and that, unlike the other changes discussed above, makes 
very good sense when enacted by itself. 
223. The consequences of reversing the General Utilities principle were analyzed in 
superb fashion in Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and 
Sales in Liquidation, in 3 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WVAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION 
COMPENDIUM, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1643 (Comm. Print 1959). Similar insights appear to 
underlie Professor Wolfman's unusual move of beginning his casebook with the General 
Utilities case. B. WVOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 5 (1971). 
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B. A Promising Package: Thorough Integration, Abolition of the 
Capital Gains Preference, and Reversal of the General Utilities 
Principle 
Although superficial thought might suggest that one could undo the 
existing problems of the corporate tax culture simply by abolishing 
the corporate tax, the preceding analyses of isolated changes should 
have demonstrated what the reflective reader will long have suspected: 
effective reform requires more radical change. None of the basic 
changes hypothesized above would alone solve all current problems 
within the corporate tax culture, and only one-reversal of the Gen- 
eral Utilities principle-would have no major doctrinal disadvantages. 
Apparently, radical simplification or improvement of the corporate 
tax culture is to be accomplished, if at all, by changes in more than 
one of the basic decisions. 
The remainder of the article applies this lesson by positing a com- 
bination of changes in the basic principles of the corporate tax culture 
and tracing the consequences. The composition of the chosen package 
is premised upon a simple intuition: to effect permanent improvement 
in the present law, one must effect fundamental changes in each set of 
basic principles-the double tax set (the separate tax and distribution 
principles), the capital gains set (the capital gains, dividend, and 
corporate veil principles), and the nonrecognition set (the nonrecogni- 
tion and General Utilities principles). The combination analyzed be- 
low radically alters the first set and modifies the veil principle by 
applying to corporations an integration scheme similar to that now 
used to tax the capital gains income of regulated investment com- 
panies.224 A related scheme has already been proposed in the justly 
celebrated Canadian study by a group known as the Carter Commis- 
sion.225 To defuse more thoroughly the bailout opportunities that 
stem from both the second and third sets, the package abolishes the 
capital gains preference. Finally, the package reverses the General 
Utilities principle to eliminate its largely undesirable consequences.226 
The rationale of this approach to reform appears deceptively simple. 
To find a combination of changes that would unravel most of the 
existing corporate tax culture without breeding unforseeable new 
complexities is a difficult riddle. If the answer to the riddle can be 
224. I.R.C. ? 852(b)(3). See Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Financial In- 
termediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1624-28 (1975). 
225. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (1966) (Canada). 
226. The general nonrecognition provisions are left intact, partly because their aboli- 
tion might be economically undesirable, see p. 152 supra, partly out of deference to the 
general income tax law's realization requirement. 
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seen in the reform package that follows, it is only because we are, in 
Newton's phrase, "standing on the shoulders of giants."227 
Suppose that corporations were taxed somewhat like partnerships, 
but with provisions for withholding taxes at the corporate level. Cur- 
rently distributed earnings would be taxed only to the shareholders, at 
their individual marginal rates for ordinary income. Undistributed 
current earnings could be "allocated" to shareholders by fiat of the 
corporation. Allocated earnings would not be taxed separately at the 
appropriate corporate level; rather, the corporation would pay a with- 
holding tax on such earnings, at the highest marginal rate applicable to 
individuals. The shareholders would receive notices describing their 
pro rata shares of the allocated income and the taxes withheld. Share- 
holders in the highest marginal tax bracket would pay no further tax 
on allocated income. Other individual shareholders could claim re- 
funds equal to the difference between the tax withheld by the corpora- 
tion and the tax actually due (determined by multiplying their shares 
of the allocated income by their particular marginal tax rates). The 
immediate-refund feature would provide an incentive for the corpora- 
tion to allocate retained earnings. When it could not feasibly do so 
(because of a complex capital structure, for example), it would pay a 
tax, at the highest individual marginal rate, on earnings not currently 
distributed or allocated.228 If the retained but unallocated earnings 
were eventually distributed, the shareholder-recipients would be 
treated as though they had received both the distributed amount and 
the associated tax previously paid by the corporation, but would re- 
ceive a credit for the tax paid by the corporation. Shareholders not in 
the highest bracket would then receive a refund (but no compensation 
for its deferral). 
After an allocation of undistributed income, each shareholder's basis 
in his stock would be adjusted upward by the amount of his pro rata 
share of the allocated income less his pro rata share of the taxes with- 
227. See generally R. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS (1965) (erudite historical 
account of phrase, suggesting great importance of cumulative, interrelated advances in 
human knowledge). 
228. The description of the integration technique in the text focuses only on in- 
dividual shareholders and shareholders that are trusts. Corporate shareholders raise 
problems that cannot be explored in adequate detail here. One simple approach would 
be to require corporate shareholders, whether or not they control the companies in which 
they hold stock, to treat amounts distributed or allocated to them as part of their income 
from operations and thus as eligible for integrated treatment with respect to their own 
shareholders. "Pass-through" taxation would thus extend through any number of tiers of 
corporations, until individuals finally were taxed. This approach rejects the view that 
there is a sufficient reason (such as the undesirability of corporate pyramids) for the 
tax law to penalize intercorporate distributions. 
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held. This adjustment would ensure that retained, allocated, and thus 
already taxed income would not be taxed again should a shareholder 
later sell his stock at a price reflecting these retained earnings. The 
adjustment modifies the corporate veil decision but would entail far 
smaller administrative costs than the one already discussed.229 
The general effect of the changes thus far would be to make 
corporations taxable in the same way as partnerships, except that a 
withholding system would be instituted to ease the difficulties of 
collecting a shareholder-level tax on undistributed income, and a 
separate corporate tax would persist for corporate income that re- 
mained undistributed and unallocated. Now suppose further that the 
capital gains principle were abolished. 
All business forms would bear essentially identical tax burdens. 
This would reduce the significance of choice of business form and 
would render subchapter S unnecessary. The macroeconomic con- 
sequences would seem ideal, for the greater equality of taxation among 
various business forms would mean, all other things being equal, little 
misallocation of resources into or out of the corporate sector. Nontax 
business considerations could thus take precedence. Furthermore, there 
should be no disharmonies within the progressive rate structure ap- 
plied to individual taxpayers, since corporate-source income would in 
most cases be taxed at each individual shareholder's personal rate. 
The triad of tax models (corporate overtax, proprietorship, and 
corporate undertax) would be reduced to one. 
The resulting model would eliminate incentives to disguise salaries, 
229. For a numerical illustration of the entire procedure, consider the standard 
corporation and shareholder of note 43 supra. The corporation earns an additional $100, 
distributes $48 as a dividend to the shareholder, then "allocates" to his stock the re- 
tained $52. The $48 is taxed only once, to the shareholder, at his 70% marginal rate: 
the tax paid is therefore $33.60. The corporation pays a withholding tax of $36.40 (70%, 
the highest marginal rate for individuals, times $52, the allocated retained earnings). 
The shareholder receives a notice that he must report a constructive dividend of $52 on 
his tax return but can take credit for the $36.40 paid by the corporation. Since $36.40 is 
exactly his tax liability for the constructive dividend, the credit exactly offsets his tax 
liability for that dividend. The total tax on the additional $100 of corporate income is 
thus $33.60 plus $36.40, or $70. This is exactly the total that this investor would pay if 
he operated as a partner or sole proprietor, and the equivalence will hold true for every 
lower-bracket taxpayer. The shareholder with a 50%' marginal rate, for example, would 
pay a $24 tax on his real dividend of $48. His tax liability on the $52 constructive 
dividend would be $26. His tax credit would still be $36.40, the amount paid by the 
corporation, and he would receive a refund of $10.40. The total tax burden would be 
$50; $24 plus $36.40, minus $10.40. 
In each case, the shareholder's claim on retained earnings is reduced by $36.40, the 
amount paid by the corporation as a withholding tax. To prevent the retained but 
allocated earnings from being taxed again should the shareholder sell his stock, the 
stock basis is then increased by $15.60 (the $52 of retained earnings minus the with- 
holding tax of $36.40). 
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interest payments, and the like as dividends, or vice-versa, for all 
would be taxed in the same manner. This beneficial effect would not 
depend on whether the shareholders were in high or low tax brackets. 
The provisions for withholding taxes on retained but allocated earn- 
ings would vitiate the tax advantages of retaining such earnings and 
thereby would obviate in great part the accumulated earnings tax and 
personal holding company tax provisions. Simple bailout devices 
would be partially eliminated, for the stock basis adjustments follow- 
ing allocation of retained earnings would reduce the present tensions 
resulting from differential treatment of distributions and dispositions. 
Since retained but allocated earnings would be taxed at once and 
would incur no further tax whether actually distributed or cashed in 
by disposition of stock, there would be, with respect to allocated earn- 
ings, no tax advantage in resorting to a stock sale, redemption, or 
partial liquidation instead of a distribution. 
Two problems, however, would remain. The first and less important 
is that of realized corporate earnings that might be retained but not 
allocated. A stock disposition often would produce gain attributable to 
these earnings, and any such gain would be subjected to a double tax- 
the corporate tax on the unallocated retained earnings plus an ordinary 
income tax to the shareholder upon sale of his stock. The rule for 
basis recovery in stock dispositions would mitigate the impact of this 
second tax by reducing the taxable gain to an amount significantly be- 
low the shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's post-tax 
retained but unallocated earnings. Yet a distribution of the same 
earnings would produce no tax, or even a refund, to the shareholder. 
This would at least eliminate any remaining need for the accumulated 
earnings tax and personal holding company tax provisions, which are 
designed to prevent tax avoidance through retention of earnings. But 
the tax discrepancy between distributions and dispositions, which has 
proved so troublesome in the present system, would persist in inverse 
form. In the new system, however, this problem should have few ob- 
jectionable practical effects, at least for retained but unallocated earn- 
ings. No principle would mandate double taxation; that taxpayers 
might choose to avoid a double tax by employing distributions instead 
of stock sales would thus be unobjectionable. And in any event, the 
immediate-refund advantage of the allocation technique would mo- 
tivate taxpayers to arrange capital structures and other variables to 
ensure allocation of retained earnings and thus would moot the 
problem.230 
230. Recall that the tax rate applied to all retained earnings, whether or not allocated, 
was set at the highest marginal rate for individuals. Hence, if a corporation retained but 
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The second and more important remaining problem is that of un- 
realized appreciation in the value of corporate assets. Because the 
reform package would not abolish the realization requirement of the 
general income tax law, unrealized gains would not produce income 
at the corporate level. This, no doubt, would prompt taxpayers to 
invent schemes for realizing such gains at the shareholder level through 
transactions that qualify for disposition-type treatment. The purpose, 
of course, would be to exploit the new system's obvious means of re- 
ducing taxes-the rule for "recovery of basis first" in dispositions. This 
could lead to further manipulations of the present bailout devices.231 
The logical solution is to eliminate the computational disparity 
between distributions and dispositions. The approach explored earlier, 
which sets up earnings and profits accounts for each share, is almost 
certainly unworkable.232 Moreover, the problem appears inherently 
incapable of resolution. In order better to appreciate this important 
point, consider an alternative means of eliminating the disparate treat- 
ment, a means that appears at first blush to be an effective solution: 
instead of assimilating dispositions to distributions, try to assimilate 
distributions to dispositions. 
Suppose, for example, that the reform package were supplemented 
by reversing the second aspect of the dividend principle-that distribu- 
tions presumptively come first out of the corporation's earnings and 
profits. In its place would stand a new principle: 
The constructive stock sale rule. Every distribution from a corpo- 
ration to a shareholder in his role as shareholder shall be treated 
as a sale of part of his stock to the corporation. The percentage of 
shares deemed sold shall equal the ratio between the amount 
distributed to the shareholder and the redistribution value of 
his shares. 
The basic insight behind this approach is simple. Shares of stock may 
be viewed as residual claims against company assets, rather than as 
pieces of paper (stock certificates). A corporate distribution of assets, 
whether in cash or in kind, affects these claims. The result can be 
described in either of two ways. One could assume that the number of 
did not allocate earnings, its highest-bracket shareholders would not benefit, and all 
other shareholders would lose a current refund. Accordingly, corporations would be 
under pressure to simplify their capital structures so that allocations could be made. In 
this respect, the new system might have a distorting effect on business decisions. 
231. The purpose of all the bailouts described in Part II is, by definition, to extract 
corporate earnings at capital gains rates. See p. 105 & note 13 supra. This requires 
disposition-type tax treatment. "Recovery of basis first" is an additional benefit that 
does not depend on the capital gains preference. 
232. See pp. 108-10 supra. 
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claims is fixed, and say that the distribution decreases their values. 
Or one could assume that the value of each claim is fixed, and say that 
the distribution decreases the number of claims. 
A constructive stock sale rule would be based on the latter con- 
ceptualization. If, for example, a dividend equal to ten percent of the 
corporation's assets were distributed to shareholders, then ten per- 
cent of each shareholder's stock would be deemed to have been sold 
back to the corporation.233 To avoid complications caused by elaborate 
capital structures, the rule would focus on individual shareholders; it 
would use the market value of their holdings to calculate the per- 
centage of stock deemed sold and would allow separate treatment for 
distributions on different classes of each one's stock. If a shareholder 
had 100 shares of common stock worth $100 and received a $10 divi- 
dend, lhe would be deemed to have sold ten percent of his common 
shares to his company. Hence, the $10 would first be applied against 
his basis in those shares. Any excess would be considered ordinary 
taxable income because of the abolition of the capital gains preference, 
and any shortfall would be ordinary loss. Such a rule would raise 
various technical problems that might readily be solved.234 Under its 
aegis, distributions and dispositions for equal values would produce 
equal amounts of reportable gain for shareholders.235 The equivalence 
233. A roughly analogous approach appears in I.R.C. ? 305(c), which in effect permits 
the Service to find constructive stock dividends. 
234. For example, in a pure distribution, actual stock certificates are not relinquished 
by shareholders. This would create problematic tax-deferral opportunities if the basis 
seduction were applied only to the shares by which it was measured. The rule would 
therefore have to mandate that the basis reduction be spread among all shares of the 
affected class of stock held by each individual receiving a distribution. If the basis re- 
duction were not spread among all shares of an affected class, a shareholder might be 
able to preserve one block of shares with a high basis, which he could sell with minimum 
tax liability. 
235. Suppose that X Corporation has the following balance sheet: 
Assets Liabilities 
cost market value 
Asset A $10 $50 Legal capital $60 
Asset B 50 50 Retained earnings 0 
The sole shareholder (S) owns 100 shares, each with a basis of 60 cents. 
(a) S sells half his shares to an outsider for $50. His gain is $50 minus $30 (the basis 
of half his shares), or $20, which is taxed at his ordinary marginal rate. 
(b) Instead of selling half his shares, S causes X to distribute to him as a dividend either 
Asset A or Asset B. The amount of the distribution is $50. Since the predistribution value 
of his shares was $100, he is treated as if he has sold 50/100 of his 100 shares (i.e., 50 
shares) to his corporation. His gain is therefore $50 (the amount received) minus $30 
(the basis of half his shares), or $20, which is taxable, as always, at his ordinary marginal 
rate. 
S actually continues, however, to hold all 100 shares. To prevent possible inequities or 
manipulations, see note 234 supra, the law would require that the $30 basis reduction be 
spread evenly. Each share's basis would therefore be reduced from 60 to 30 cents. 
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would obtain automatically, even for distributions in kind.236 Hence, 
a major source of problems-the General Utilities principle-would 
be mooted.237 
Unfortunately, however, a constructive stock sale rule would create 
grave difficulties that outweigh its advantages. Though the rule's ad- 
ministrative costs would be significantly less than those of its alterna- 
tive,238 collecting the necessary data and applying the rule to all dis- 
tributions would still be expensive. Moreover, while introducing an 
element of basis recovery into the treatment of distributions would 
reconcile their treatment with that of dispositions, it would create 
numerous other discrepancies. Interest payments on debt securities are 
not offset by any part of the debt's basis; if the rule were not extended 
to debt securities, investors might therefore try to disguise bonds and 
debentures as preferred stock. Similarly, unless the rule were extended 
to allocated but retained income, shareholders would favor actual dis- 
tributions over allocations. These difficulties might seem palatable, or 
at least an acceptable price to pay for the benefits of a constructive 
stock sale rule. But the deeper problem with the rule is that it would 
reintroduce a discrepancy between the treatment of corporate-source 
income and income from partnerships or proprietorships. The former, 
but not the latter, would be regularly offset by some portion of the 
investor's basis in his investment interest. To attempt to rectify this 
discrepancy-a more important one, presumably, than that between 
dividends and stock sales-by applying a variant of the rule to partners 
236. See example (b) in note 235 supra. 
237. Observe that, in the example in note 235 supra, it makes no difference whether 
Asset A (the appreciated asset) or Asset B (the unappreciated asset) is distributed. 
Furthermore, if S liquidated X first and then sold the assets for cash, the tax result 
would be the same as if X had sold the assets for cash and then distributed the proceeds 
to S in liquidation. In the former case, S would have gain of $40 on the liquidation; the 
basis of Asset A would be stepped up (because the appreciation in value was just taxed); 
and no further gain would result when the assets were sold at their market value. In the 
latter case, the asset sale would produce $40 of gain to X. But, since the $40 would be 
currently distributed, only S, under the integration technique, would pay a tax on it. 
Thus the new system would have no need for ? 337, which was designed to harmonize 
the corporate asset sale-liquidation sequence with the liquidation-stockholder asset sale 
sequence. See p. 131 & note 173 supra. 
238. Only three data would be needed to operate a constructive stock sale rule: the 
number of each individual's shares to which the distribution applies, the dollar value of 
the distribution on those shares, and the predistribution market value of the shares. 
Workable mechanical rules for implementing the new procedure could easily be devised. 
For example, one might define "the redistribution market value of shares" as the 
average of the closing prices of the stock on the 10 business days immediately preceding 
the date on which the declaration of the distribution was made. 
A trust department or shareholder with many holdings might find it annoying to 
apply the rule to numerous dividends received every quarter. This difficulty could be 
ameliorated by making the rule elective. Less tractable is the problem of valuing stock in 
close corporations. 
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and proprietors would entail sweeping and costly changes throughout 
the tax law. 
The lesson of this illustration is that the discrepancy between the 
tax treatments of distributions and dispositions is an instance of a 
much more general problem. The present income tax law generally 
prohibits owners of assets of indefinite life (such as bonds, stock, or 
land) from offsetting recurrent earnings by amortization of basis; basis 
recovery is permitted only upon sale of the asset. Thus, ground rents 
are not offset by depreciation or other amortization deductions, but 
gain upon sale is computed as amount received minus the seller's basis 
in the land.239 Whether it makes sense to allow amortization of the 
basis of assets of indefinite life, and, if so, what the appropriate 
amortization formula should be, are general questions that should not 
be given ad hoc answers in specific areas of the tax law. 
Reformists should thus bear in mind that unless one is prepared to 
embark upon sweeping general income tax law revisions such as aboli- 
tion of the general realization requirement or overhaul of the treat- 
ment of all assets of indefinite life, one must accept some discrepancy 
between the tax treatments of distributions and dispositions. The 
thorough integration technique proposed above would confine the 
problem principally to gains attributable to appreciated corporate as- 
sets, and the abolition of the capital gains preference would mitigate 
it by reducing it to a question only of the amount of income, not of 
tax rates as well. This may be as much as corporate tax reform can 
accomplish. 
The final addition to the reform package would be a reversal of the 
General Utilities principle to eliminate its isolable and generally ob- 
jectionable consequences, particularly the collapsible corporation de- 
vice and section 341. This would complete the attack on the present 
law's most troublesome aspects, for the first two components of the 
reform combination would remove most of the tensions surrounding 
simple bailout devices as well as eradicate nonrecognition bailouts.240 
The nonrecognition provisions would still be needed to prevent taxa- 
tion of unrealized appreciation in asset values in transactions involv- 
ing a substantial continuity of ownership interests (for example, cer- 
tain stock dividends and legitimate reorganizations). These rules would 
be no more complex than at present; they could not be abolished with- 
239. See M. CHIRELSTE1N, supra note 61, at ? 6.07. 
240. The integration technique and associated stock basis adjustments would mean 
that retained earnings would not produce gain in nonrecognition transactions even if 
such transactions were taxed. 
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out substantial encroachment upon the realization principle of the 
general income tax law. 
The reform package as a whole would thus unravel most of the 
noxious ramifications of the existing set of basic principles of corporate 
tax law. It would not eliminate the desire to minimize or evade taxes 
nor would it alter the behavioral tendencies of the Service, the courts, 
and Congress. General income tax avoidance strategies, such as fraud 
or "income-splitting," would thus be likely to continue in the corporate 
tax area. But careful examination of the package will show that it 
would eliminate most of the major unique opportunities for tax 
avoidance that now inhere in the intricate and sometimes internally 
inconsistent corporate tax culture. Such a combination of reforms 
offers at least a hope that the processes of cultural evolution will slow 
and perhaps stop at a more acceptable level of complexity, confusion, 
and expense.24' 
Conclusion 
The first two parts of this article explored the morphogenesis of the 
corporate tax, uncovering its roots and tracing the multitude of legal 
rules and doctrines to the basic principles from which they derive. Part 
III explored possible metamorphoses of the law-the changes in its 
form that would result from alterations of the basic principles. The 
one combination of reforms chosen for analysis represents a provisional 
attempt to indicate a package of changes that holds promise, not only 
because of its direct effects on allocative and distributive aspects of 
the tax system, but also because of its reduction of complexities and 
structural tensions in the legal culture. The aim has not been to assert 
definitively how the law should be changed. Rather, it has been to 
demonstrate the utility of an axiomatic method of analyzing reforms. 
The central question implicitly raised is whether human decision- 
makers can transcend in a rational and successful manner the blind, 
unpremeditated processes of cultural evolution. Having become con- 
scious of the laws of development of the tax culture, can we effectively 
241. The reform-oriented tax lawyer who looks solely for new and decisively better 
solutions to present problems may be disappointed with the ultimate conclusion of this 
article. The reform package discussed in the text consists of elements already suggested 
by others. The purpose of this analysis however, is not merely to generate another plan 
of reform but to establish, in a comprehensive, systematic way, the superior value of one 
set of changes by reference to a largely neglected consideration-the reform's likelihood 
of reducing costs within the corporate tax culture. In this essay, the frequent injunction 
to simplify the whole system has been taken in dead earnest. I have pursued simplifica- 
tion as the Hound of Heaven pursued the poet Thompson. 
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improve them? As Part III demonstrates, one can predict methodically 
the consequences of changing some or all of the basic decisions that 
underlie the present system. Such an inquiry undoubtedly succeeds 
better in recapitulating old problems that the contemplated changes 
would eliminate, aggravate, or leave untouched than in forecasting 
entirely new problems created by alternative schemes. In law at least, 
the gift of prophecy is distressingly rare, in part because well-founded 
predictions are an inadequately subsidized public good. The lawyer's 
grasp of this reality may account for some of the conservatism of many 
past studies of corporate tax reform. But part of the problem is surely 
that policymakers do not usually feel sufficiently certain about the 
effects of proposed reforms on the entire set of familiar problems. It 
is hoped that the methods employed in this essay will contribute to 
a reduction of these uncertainties and, ultimately, to a rational 
transcendence of the past.242 
242. A notable current effort at rational transcendence of subchapter C is the American 
Law Institute project, which recently reached a propitious stage with the publication of 
its work on corporate acquisitions. ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C 
(tent. draft no. 1, March 25, 1977). 
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